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1.1 General background 
In economic environments, decision-makers’ actions are bound to many possible outcomes. 
Since not all of these outcomes are beneficial to decision-makers, they must take economic 
decisions while facing some level of uncertainty (Ihli & Musshoff, 2013; Moschini & 
Henessy, 2001). Since producers could not control with certainty their production outcomes, 
then it is implied that uncertainty is an element intrinsically bound to production (Moschini & 
Henessy, 2001). The agricultural sector as an economic environment is not exempt from this 
reality. Daily producers must take decisions about their production systems under uncertain 
situations: future market prices, cost fluctuation of production inputs, climate variation, 
technological uncertainty, and financial constraints are just a few examples of these uncertain 
situations (Charness & Viceisza, 2012; Liu, 2012; Moschini & Henessy, 2001). 
Therefore, as a way to help producers cope with uncertainty in their production systems, it is 
relevant to analyze producers’ behavior and decision-making under uncertainty. Many 
agricultural researchers have studied producers’ behavior under uncertainty and the 
characteristics that trigger differences in this behavior (Bocqueho et al., 2013; Harrison et al., 
2010; Tanaka et al., 2010; Warnick et al., 2011). These researchers provide empirical 
evidence about producers’ behavior under uncertainty that serve as inputs for designing 
efficient policies (Barham et al., 2014; Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). 
In addition, as a complement for producers’ behavior under uncertainty, researchers also 
focus on finding alternative methods for producers to cope with this production uncertainty 
(Elabed & Carter, 2015; Liu, 2012; Ward & Singh, 2015). Hence, one of the most studied 
methods in current literature to cope with production uncertainty is producer’s adoption of 
new and improved technologies (Adesina & Chianu, 2002; Lewis et al., 2011; Love et al., 
2014). In addition to help producers cope with uncertainty, technology adoption could also 
improve producer’s living conditions (Liu, 2012; Love et al., 2014). Also other benefits of 
technology adoption are that is relatively easy for producers to test technologies, also 
agricultural technologies are usually accessible and easy to introduce in different countries 
(Cavatassi et al., 2011; Ward & Singh, 2015). All of these benefits make adoption of some 
agricultural technologies a convenient alternative for producers to cope with uncertainty, or to 
increase their current production in developing countries. 
As of today, most studies in the current literature that analyze producers’ behavior under 
uncertainty and technology adoption focus on small-scale producers in developing countries, 
because these producers face harder constraints to adapt and cope with production uncertainty 
(Handschuch et al., 2013; Morton, 2007). However, studies that analyze producers’ behavior 
 




under uncertainty are scarce in Latin America. Moreover, I am not aware of previous studies 
in Chile that analyze the role of producers’ behavior under uncertainty on technology 
adoption. To fill this gap, in this dissertation I focus on small-scale raspberry producers in 
Maule region of Chile. I decide to focus on these raspberry producers because the analysis of 
producers’ behavior and technology adoption of soft fruits producer have not been much 
explored in developing countries. Also, the current situation of small-scale raspberry 
producers is not much different from other soft fruits producers in Chilean central regions 
(Domínguez, 2012). The Maule region alone accounts for more than sixteen thousand small-
scale raspberry producers (Domínguez, 2012; Jara-Rojas et al., 2016). 
This doctoral dissertation consists of two studies, which represent the main chapters of this 
dissertation. In these chapters, I combine experimental procedures and spatial methods to 
address producers’ behavior under uncertainty, and technology adoption in developing 
countries. In the following sections, I briefly discuss these two chapters. 
1.2 Producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences and policy-making design 
In past decades, researchers considered that uncertainty was composed by risk alone, as a 
consequence producers’ preferences under risk scenarios are widely studied in the current 
literature (Binswanger, 1980; Moschini & Henessy, 2001; Nguyen, 2011; Tanaka et al., 
2010). In this regard, risk scenarios in agriculture occur when producers must face a decision 
with complete information about outcomes and probabilities involved (Binswanger, 1980; 
Chavas & Holt, 1996; Moschini & Henessy, 2001). However, recent studies explore 
ambiguity as a complement to risk to characterize uncertainty (Barham et al., 2014; Klibanoff 
et al., 2005). Ambiguity scenarios in agriculture arise when producers face a decision with 
incomplete information about the outcomes and probabilities involved (Takahashi, 2013; 
Ward & Singh, 2015). 
Many studies have demonstrated that producers are averse to risk and ambiguity (Barham et 
al., 2014; Binswanger, 1980; Tanaka et al., 2010). This finding has encouraged many 
researchers to study the role of producers’ aversion on producer’s decision-making process 
(Liu, 2012; Warnick et al., 2011). Most of these studies confirm a link between producers’ 
risk and ambiguity aversion and producer’s decision-making process. Some examples of the 
link between producer’s decision-making process and their risk and ambiguity preferences 
are: agricultural insurance uptake (Elabed & Carter, 2015; McIntosh et al., 2015), crop 
diversification (Bezabih & Sarr, 2012; Warnick et al., 2011), technology adoption (Liu, 2012; 
Ward & Singh, 2015), and producers coordination (Alpizar et al., 2011). Hence, identifying 
producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, and producer’s characteristics that influence these 
 




preferences is crucial for policy-makers, as these preferences could provide meaningful 
elements to create efficient agricultural policies. 
I use the experiments developed by Tanaka et al. (2010) and further modified by Ward & 
Singh (2015) to identify small-scale Chilean raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences. But, in current literature there are two common methods to identify producers’ 
risk preferences from Tanaka’s field experiment: the midpoint method (Liu, 2012; Tanaka et 
al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015) and the structural method (Andersen et al., 2010; Bocqueho 
et al., 2013; Harrison et al., 2010). As of today, Only Bocqueho et al. (2013) identify and 
compare producers’ preferences by using both methods in a developed country context. 
Therefore, there is not much empirical evidence regarding whether the method used to 
estimate producers’ risk preferences could deliver different results, especially in a developing 
country context. 
Most of the current literature that analyzes producers’ risk preferences focuses on small-scale 
producers and in developing countries. This is because these producers are more vulnerable 
and face stiffer constraints to cope with uncertainty (Elabed & Carter, 2015; Handschuch et 
al., 2013; Ward & Singh, 2015; Warnick et al., 2011). However, one of the main issues that 
agricultural researchers usually encounter in developing countries, is the lack of information 
to determine producers’ preferences from existent data. Therefore, this situation forced many 
researchers to develop methods to determine such preferences by direct interaction with 
producers (Andersen et al., 2006; Holt & Laury, 2002; Tanaka et al., 2010). Among the 
methods to estimate producers’ preferences, many researchers prefer direct elicitation using 
incentivized field economic experiments, because they are simple to use and to comprehend 
by producers (Charness et al., 2013; Harrison & Rutström, 2008; Holt & Laury, 2002). In 
these experiments, producers decide between binary lotteries in controlled scenarios, these 
lotteries have known outcomes, but different known and, in some cases, unknown 
probabilities associated with these outcomes. In this way, risk and ambiguity are present into 
the experiments (Andersen et al., 2006; Ward & Singh, 2015). 
The influence of producers’ risk preferences on many agricultural decision-making processes 
is widely explored in the current literature (Barham et al., 2015; Liu, 2012; Takeshima & 
Yamauchi, 2012). However, the analysis of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences jointly, 
as components to characterize producers’ behavior under uncertainty, and the socioeconomic 
and farm characteristics that determine these preferences are scarcely explored in developing 
countries, and particularly in Latin American countries (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2013; Nielsen 
et al., 2013; Warnick et al., 2011). 
 




In light of the above, in my second chapter I study producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences 
under uncertainty. I use field experiments to elicit small-scale Chilean raspberry producers’ 
risk and ambiguity preferences. In addition, I identify and compare producers’ preferences by 
using the two most common methods in the literature to estimate producers’ preferences from 
the field experiment developed by Tanaka et al. (2010). Furthermore, I estimate probit and 
OLS models to distinguish determinants of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences 
(Harrison et al., 2010; Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). 
With this research, I provide inputs for a better characterization of producers’ decision-
making process under uncertainty. First, I compare the most common methods in the 
literature to estimate producers’ risk preferences from field experiments, and highlight the 
differences in the results by using both methods. Second, I distinguish producers’ 
characteristics that are determinants of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences. I pursue 
both of these objectives using data from field experiments carried out with smallholder 
raspberry producers in Chile. I am aware of no studies to date that analyze producers’ risk and 
ambiguity preferences jointly in Chile or any other Latin American countries. 
1.3 Agricultural technology adoption and small-scale producers’ 
production uncertainty 
Small-scale producers must deal with a wide range of production uncertainty sources, 
including financial limitations, future product prices, and climate variability and climate 
change. As a response, agricultural researchers focus on study methods that could help 
producers to cope with production uncertainty (Cavatassi et al., 2011; Handschuch et al., 
2013; Warnick et al., 2011). One of these methods is the adoption of improved technologies. 
Technology adoption can not only help producers cope with production uncertainty, but it 
also correlates with economic development and with better living conditions (Liu, 2012). 
Therefore, many researchers focus on adoption of improved technologies as a key component 
in agricultural policy-making design, and ultimately help producers to cope with production 
uncertainty (Liu, 2012; Ward & Singh, 2015). 
However, despite of the benefits of adopting improved technologies, producers are not always 
keen to do so. Much research has been carried out to explain this (Liu, 2012; Maertens & 
Barrett, 2012; Wossen et al., 2015). Many authors report empirical evidence that suggests that 
many producer’s characteristics could assist or constraint producers’ decision to adopt 
technology. Some examples of these characteristics are: producer’s risk and ambiguity 
preferences (Liu, 2012; Love et al., 2014; Ward & Singh, 2015; Warnick et al., 2011); and, 
their socioeconomic and farm attributes: education, farm size, experience and age, among 
others (Adesina & Chianu, 2002; Krishnan & Patnam, 2013; Mendola, 2007; Nkegbe & 
 




Shankar, 2014). In addition to these characteristics there is an additional factor that is being 
explored in recent literature, which is the influence of spatial patterns among producers on 
technology adoption. These spatial patterns are composed by a spatial dependence component 
and spatial spill-over effects (Läpple & Kelley, 2014; Roe et al., 2002). Spatial dependence 
refers to whether a producer’s attitude towards a technology could influence neighboring 
producers’ attitudes, and their decisions to adopt the same technology (Bhargava et al., 2015; 
Läpple & Kelley, 2014; Roe et al., 2002; Wollni & Andersson, 2014). Spatial spill-over 
effects refer to whether a change in a producer’s characteristics could influence neighboring 
producers’ decisions to adopt (Lacombe & LeSage, 2015; Läpple & Kelley, 2014; Wollni & 
Andersson, 2014). 
Chilean policy-makers are aware of the importance of producer’s technology adoption, as a 
way to cope with production uncertainty. Technology adoption is a key component in the 
National Plan to Adapt Forestry, Farming and Livestock Development to Climate Change and 
Climate Variability (Gobierno de Chile, 2013; Universidad de Chile, 2006). Therefore, 
producer’s adoption of improved varieties, water-saving irrigation techniques, and other soil 
and water conservation practices play a relevant role for producers to cope with production 
uncertainty in Chile. Although producer’s adoption of these practices is relevant for Chilean 
policy-makers, I am not aware of previous studies that analyze technology adoption in Chile. 
Consequently, analyzing producer’s decisions to adopt a technology, their characteristics, and 
the preferences that influence these decisions, could contribute to strengthening the National 
Plan (Gobierno de Chile, 2013).  
Considering the explanation above, in the third chapter I analyze small-scale raspberry 
producer’s decision to adopt improved raspberry varieties and drip irrigation in the Maule 
region of Chile. I use a spatial Durbin probit model to identify the influence of producer’s 
socioeconomic and farm characteristics, risk and ambiguity preferences, and spatial patterns 
on their decision to adopt technology. This spatial Durbin probit model combines the 
advantages of a non-spatial probit model which casts light on the role of producer’s 
characteristics on their decision to adopt, with the ability to reveal spatial patterns in 
technology adoption (Lacombe & LeSage, 2015; Läpple & Kelley, 2014; Roe et al., 2002). 
This second paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, I am not aware of previous 
studies that combine producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences that stem from direct 
elicitation with field experiments, and spatial methods to analyze producer’s decision to adopt 
technology. Second, the role of spatial patterns among producers is a scarcely explored field 
in developing countries, hence I contribute with empirical evidence about whether producer’s 
decisions and characteristics influence their neighboring producers’ decision to adopt 
 




technology. Third, since many studies report mixed evidence about the influence of 
producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences on technology adoption, I contribute with 
empirical evidence about the role of these preferences on producer’s decision to adopt 
technology (Alpizar et al., 2011; Love et al., 2014; Ray et al., 2016; Ward & Singh, 2015; 
Warnick et al., 2011). My findings have a direct link to the National Plan to Adapt Forestry, 
Farming and Livestock Development to Climate Change and Climate Variability, by 
revealing insights about small-scale producers and their decisions to adopt improved 
raspberry varieties and drip irrigation. 
1.4 Following chapters 
This dissertation presents two studies in the field of producers’ behavior under uncertainty 
and technology adoption. Following this introductory chapter, I present in chapter 2 a paper 
entitled “Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences: 
evidence from field-experiments data in rural Chile”. As outlined above, in this paper I 
conduct incentivized field experiments to elicit producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences. In 
addition, I use probit and OLS models to identify producer’s characteristics as determinants 
of these preferences. This research has been published as a Discussion Paper in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development of the University of 
Göttingen1. 
In chapter 3 I present a second paper entitled “The role of spatial patterns and producers’ 
risk and ambiguity preferences on small-scale agricultural technology adoption”. In this 
paper, I use producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences that were elicited in chapter 2, and 
combine these preferences with producer’s characteristics, using spatial methods to analyze 
producers’ decisions to adopt technology. As a result, I am able to identify how producers’ 
preferences, their socioeconomic and farm characteristics and whether spatial patterns 
influence producer’s decision to adopt drip irrigation and improved raspberry varieties. 
Finally, chapter 4 presents the concluding remarks of the two studies, key findings and 
limitations of my research, and briefly describes prospects for future research. 
Contributions 
The paper entitled “Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences: evidence from field-experiments data in rural Chile” is coauthored by Prof. Dr. 
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Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel2. My contributions to this paper are: first, I designed the 
experiments and questionnaire that used during the field work. Second, I trained the field 
enumerators and supervise their work. And third, I wrote the code to estimate producers’ risk 
and ambiguity preferences from the results of the field work. In close cooperation with Prof. 
Dr. Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel analyzed the results from the field experiments and 
questionnaire. Also, writing and the structure of the paper was conducted with many valuable 
comments and suggestions from Prof. Dr. Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel. 
References 
Adesina, A. A., & Chianu, J. (2002). Determinants of farmers’ adoption and adaptation of 
alley farming technology in Nigeria. Agroforestry Systems, 55(2), 99–112. 
http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020556132073 
Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F., & Naranjo, M. A. (2011). The effect of ambiguous risk, and 
coordination on farmers’ adaptation to climate change — A framed field experiment. 
Ecological Economics, 70(12), 2317–2326. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.07.004 
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. (2006). Elicitation using multiple 
price list formats. Experimental Economics, 9(4), 383–405. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-7055-6 
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. E. (2010). Preference heterogeneity 
in experiments: Comparing the field and laboratory. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 73(2), 209–224. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.006 
Barham, B. L., Chavas, J.-P., Fitz, D., Ríos-Salas, V., & Schechter, L. (2015). Risk, learning, 
and technology adoption. Agricultural Economics, 46(1), 11–24. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12123 
Barham, B. L., Chavas, J.-P., Fitz, D., Salas, V. R., & Schechter, L. (2014). The roles of risk 
and ambiguity in technology adoption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
97(0), 204–218. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.06.014 
Bezabih, M., & Sarr, M. (2012). Risk Preferences and Environmental Uncertainty: 
Implications for Crop Diversification Decisions in Ethiopia. Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 53(4), 483–505. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9573-3 
Bhargava, A. K. ., Lybbert, T. J. ., & Spielman, D. J. . (2015). Public benefits of private 
technology adoption: The localized spatial externalities of water conservation in eastern 
                                                          
2 Leader of the Agricultural Policy Chair of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development at 
the Georg-August-Universtiät Göttingen 
 




Uttar Pradesh. Michigan, USA. Retrieved from 
http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/129350 
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(3), 395–407. Journal Article. 
Bocqueho, G., Jacquet, F., & Reynaud, A. (2013). Expected utility or prospect theory 
maximisers? Assessing farmers’ risk behaviour from field-experiment data. European 
Review of Agricultural Economics, 41(1), 135–172. http://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbt006 
Cardenas, J. C., & Carpenter, J. (2013). Risk attitudes and economic well-being in Latin 
America. Journal of Development Economics, 103, 52–61. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.01.008 
Cavatassi, R., Lipper, L., & Narloch, U. (2011). Modern variety adoption and risk 
management in drought prone areas: Insights from the sorghum farmers of eastern 
Ethiopia. Agricultural Economics, 42(3), 279–292. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-
0862.2010.00514.x 
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Imas, A. (2013). Experimental methods: Eliciting risk 
preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 87, 43–51. Journal Article. 
Charness, G., & Viceisza, A. (2012). Comprehension and risk elicitation in the field: 
Evidence from rural Senegal. Journal Article. 
Chavas, J.-P., & Holt, M. T. (1996). Economic behavior under uncertainty: A joint analysis of 
risk preferences and technology. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 329–335. 
Journal Article. 
Domínguez, A. (2012). Chilean Raspberry Industry. In 8Th IRO Conference (p. 28). 
Elabed, G., & Carter, M. R. (2015). Compound-risk aversion, ambiguity and the willingness 
to pay for microinsurance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Journal 
Article. 
Gobierno de Chile. (2013). Plan de adaptación al cambio climático del sector 
silvoagropecuario. Santiago, Chile. Retrieved from 
http://www.mma.gob.cl/1304/articles-
55879_InstrumentoFinalCC_Silvoagropecuario.pdf 
Handschuch, C., Wollni, M., & Villalobos, P. (2013). Adoption of food safety and quality 
standards among Chilean raspberry producers - Do smallholders benefit? Food Policy, 
40, 64–73. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.02.002 
Harrison, G. W., Humphrey, S. J., & Verschoor, A. (2010). Choice under Uncertainty: 
Evidence from Ethiopia, India and Uganda. The Economic Journal, 120(543), 80–104. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02303.x 
Harrison, G. W., & Rutström, E. E. (2008). Risk aversion in the laboratory. Research in 
 




Experimental Economics, 12(8), 41–196. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(08)00003-
3 
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. The American 
Economic Review, 92(5), 1644–1655. Journal Article. 
Ihli, H. J., & Musshoff, O. (2013). Investment Behavior of Ugandan Smallholder Farmers: 
An Experimental Analysis (Report). GlobalFood Discussion Papers. 
Jara-Rojas, R., Bravo-Ureta, B., Solís, D., & Martínez, D. (2016). Production efficiency and 
commercialization channels among small-scale farmers: Evidence for raspberry 
production in Central Chile. In Southern Agricultural Economics Association (pp. 1–
26). 
Klibanoff, P., Marinacci, M., Applicata, M., & Torino, U. (2005). A Smooth Model of 
Decision Making Under, 73(6), 1849–1892. http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.395600 
Krishnan, P., & Patnam, M. (2013). Neighbors and Extension Agents in Ethiopia: Who 
Matters More for Technology Adoption? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
96(1), 308–327. http://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aat017 
Lacombe, D. J., & LeSage, J. P. (2015). Use and interpretation of spatial autoregressive probit 
models. The Annals of Regional Science, 1–24. JOUR. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-
015-0705-x 
Läpple, D., & Kelley, H. (2014). Spatial dependence in the adoption of organic drystock 
farming in Ireland. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 42(2), 315–337. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbu024 
Lewis, D. J., Barham, B. L., & Robinson, B. (2011). Are there spatial spillovers in the 
adoption of clean technology ? The case of organic dairy farming. Land Economics, 
87(2), 250–267. http://doi.org/10.1353/lde.2011.0030 
Liu, E. M. (2012). Time to Change What to Sow: Risk Preferences and Technology Adoption 
Decisions of Cotton Farmers in China. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1386–
1403. Journal Article. http://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00295 
Love, A., Magnan, N., & Colson, G. J. (2014). Male and Female Risk Preferences and Maize 
Technology Adoption in Kenya. 
Maertens, A., & Barrett, C. B. (2012). Measuring Social Networks’ Effects on Agricultural 
Technology Adoption. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 95(2), 353–359. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aas049 
McIntosh, C., Povell, F., & Sadoulet, E. (2015). Utility, Risk, and Demand for Incomplete 
Insurance: Lab Experiments with Guatemalan Cooperatives. Journal Article. 
Mendola, M. (2007). Agricultural technology adoption and poverty reduction: A propensity-
score matching analysis for rural Bangladesh. Food Policy, 32(3), 372–393. 
 





Morton, J. F. (2007). The impact of climate change on smallholder and subsistence 
agriculture. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(50), 19680–19685. 
Journal Article. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701855104 
Moschini, G., & Henessy, D. (2001). Chapter 2 Uncertainty, risk aversion, and risk 
management for agricultural producers. Agricultural Production, 1(Part A), 87–153. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0072(01)10005-8 
Nguyen, Q. (2011). Does nurture matter: Theory and experimental investigation on the effect 
of working environment on risk and time preferences. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
43(3), 245–270. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-011-9130-4 
Nielsen, T., Keil, A., & Zeller, M. (2013). Assessing farmers’ risk preferences and their 
determinants in a marginal upland area of Vietnam: a comparison of multiple elicitation 
techniques. Agricultural Economics, 44(3), 255–273. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12009 
Nkegbe, P. K., & Shankar, B. (2014, July 19). Adoption intensity of soil and water 
conservation practices by smallholders: evidence from Northern Ghana. Bio-Based and 
Applied Economics. http://doi.org/10.13128/BAE-13246 
Ray, M., Maredia, M., & Shupp, R. (2016). Risk preferences and adoption of climate smart 
agriculture - Evidence from India. In Agricultural and Applied Economics Association 
(p. 40). Boston, Massachusetts. 
Roe, B., Irwin, E. G., & Sharp, J. S. (2002). Pigs in Space: Modeling the Spatial Structure of 
Hog Production in Traditional and Nontraditional Production Regions. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84(2), 259–278. http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
8276.00296 
Takahashi, K. (2013). The roles of risk and ambiguity in the adoption of the system of rice 
intensification (SRI): evidence from Indonesia. Food Security, 5(4), 513–524. Journal 
Article. http://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-013-0270-z 
Takeshima, H., & Yamauchi, F. (2012). Risks and farmers’ investment in productive assets in 
Nigeria. Agricultural Economics, 43(2), 143–153. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2011.00572.x 
Tanaka, T., Camerer, C. F., & Nguyen, Q. (2010). Risk and Time Preferences: Linking 
Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam. The American Economic 
Review, 100(1), 557–571. Journal Article. http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.1.557 
Universidad de Chile. (2006). Estudio de la variabilidad climática en Chile para el siglo XXI, 
71. 
Ward, P. S., & Singh, V. (2015). Using Field Experiments to Elicit Risk and Ambiguity 
 




Preferences: Behavioural Factors and the Adoption of New Agricultural Technologies in 
Rural India. The Journal of Development Studies, 1–18. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.989996 
Warnick, J. C. E., Escobal, J., & Laszlo, S. C. (2011). Ambiguity aversion and portfolio 
choice in small-scale Peruvian farming. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 
11. Journal Article. 
Wollni, M., & Andersson, C. (2014). Spatial patterns of organic agriculture adoption: 
Evidence from Honduras. Ecological Economics, 97, 120–128. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.11.010 
Wossen, T., Berger, T., & Di Falco, S. (2015). Social capital, risk preference and adoption of 
improved farm land management practices in Ethiopia. Agricultural Economics, 46(1), 
81–97. http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12142 
 
Chapter II: Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences: evidence from 




2 Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences: evidence from field-experiment data in rural Chile 
 
Abstract 
Most researchers who analyze producers’ preferences under uncertainty report that producers 
are averse towards risk and ambiguity scenarios. This aversion has an influence on producers’ 
decision-making processes; hence the relevance of determining and analyzing these 
preferences as a key factor to design agricultural policies that help producers to cope with 
production uncertainty. In this study we elicit small-scale raspberry producers’ preferences 
through field experiments in rural Maule (Chile). In addition, we identify producers’ 
socioeconomic and farm characteristics that influence these preferences. Finally, we compare 
the two standard methods in the current literature to estimate producers’ risk preferences from 
field experiments, and analyze if the estimation method influences these preferences. 
Our results show an asymmetry in producers’ risk preferences; producers are twice as 
sensitive to losses as to gains. Additionally, we find that producers get smaller lottery utilities 
in scenarios where ambiguity is present, which implies ambiguity aversion. We also show that 
the method used to estimate risk preferences can influence the results, with obvious 
implications for policy design. 
Keywords: Risk Preferences, Ambiguity Preferences, Small-scale Producers, Raspberry 
Producers, Producers’ Preferences Elicitation. 
2.1 Introduction 
Understanding risk and ambiguity preferences is important because these preferences 
influence producers’ decision-making processes (Barham et al., 2014; Binswanger, 1980; 
Cardenas & Carpenter, 2013; Holt & Laury, 2002; Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010). In 
addition, small-scale producers face stiffer constraints to adapt their crops to uncertainty. 
Hence, researchers are increasingly conducting field experiments with small-scale producers, 
mostly in developing countries, to determine their risk and ambiguity preferences and to 
analyze the influence of these preferences on many aspects of farm decision-making, for 
instance: technology adoption (Barham et al., 2014; Liu, 2012), agricultural insurance 
demand (Elabed & Carter, 2015; McIntosh et al., 2015) and climate change adaptation 
(Alpizar et al., 2011). 
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Initially, researchers analyzed production uncertainty as composed of risk preferences alone. 
However, many researchers have found that producers behave differently when dealing with 
risk and ambiguity, and that risk and ambiguity correspondingly have different implications 
for producers’ decision-making (Alpizar et al., 2011; Barham et al., 2014; Ross et al., 2010; 
Warnick et al., 2011). Hence, we consider uncertainty as being composed of two components: 
risk and ambiguity. Ihli & Musshoff (2013) show that uncertainty aversion can lead to sub-
optimal decisions by producers. 
Most of the studies that analyze producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences focus on 
developing countries. However, in such countries it is uncommon to have access to data that 
allows to measure risk and ambiguity from pre-existing information. Consequently, 
researchers have developed experimental methods to elicit risk and ambiguity preferences 
from binary choice experiments under controlled conditions (Holt & Laury, 2002; Tanaka et 
al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015; Warnick et al., 2011). Although, the majority of empirical 
literature on risk and ambiguity preferences focuses on developing countries, the elicitation of 
these preferences is a field scarcely explored in Latin America. 
Understanding risk and ambiguity preferences is a key ingredient in designing effective 
policies. For example, the Chilean government has a special interest in helping farmers cope 
with the uncertainty that arises from climate change and climate variability. According to 
Universidad de Chile (2006), central and southern areas of the country show a decreasing 
trend in rainfall since the 1970s. This increases the probability of droughts, and creates shocks 
that can have negative effects on agricultural production. These shocks especially affect 
small-scale producers, who usually face stiffer constraints to adapt their production systems 
(Handschuch et al., 2013; Morton, 2007). The Chilean government has implemented a 
National Forestry, Farming and Livestock Development Adaptation to Climate Change plan 
to help producers cope with this situation. One of the key components of this plan refers to 
producers’ adoption of agricultural insurance and agricultural innovations such as improved 
varieties, drip irrigation, and other practices to cope with production uncertainty (Gobierno de 
Chile, 2013). However, as of today there are no studies that measure producers’ risk and 
ambiguity preferences in Chile as an input into improving the design of such policies. 
In this study we focus on small-scale raspberry producers in Chile. Raspberry production is 
attractive for small-scale producers, because of its low investment and mechanization 
requirements, and its labor intensity (Jara-Rojas et al., 2016; Toledo & Engler, 2008). 
Consequently, most of the raspberry production in Chile is in the hands of small-scale 
producers. Currently, more than twenty thousand households in Chile depend on raspberry 
production for at least part of their income (Domínguez, 2012). Due to soil and climate 
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conditions raspberry production is concentrated in central regions of Chile. The Maule region 
alone accounts for more than 16 thousand small-scale Chilean raspberry producers 
(Domínguez, 2012; Jara-Rojas et al., 2016). 
Our objectives are first to elicit small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences using economic field experiments in rural areas of Maule region, and second to 
identify the socioeconomic and farm level determinants of these preferences. To elicit 
producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, we use the experimental procedure proposed by 
Tanaka et al. (2010) and Ward & Singh (2015). In addition, we use probit and OLS models to 
identify factors that influence producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences respectively (Galarza 
& Carter, 2011; Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). As a third objective, 
we analyze whether producers’ risk preferences vary according to the estimation method. We 
do this by comparing the two standard methods that are used to analyze risk preferences from 
field experiments: the midpoint method (Liu, 2012; Nguyen, 2011; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward 
& Singh, 2015) and the structural method (Andersen et al., 2014; Bocqueho et al., 2013; 
Harrison et al., 2010). 
Our findings generate insights into producers’ decision-making processes under uncertainty in 
three ways. First, we do not use results based on experiments with students, instead, we 
generate results using field experiments with actual producers. Second, we contribute to 
current literature by distinguishing between the possibly different determinants of producers’ 
risk and ambiguity preferences. Third, we are not aware of other studies that elicit producers’ 
risk and ambiguity preferences specifically in Chile, neither are we aware of other studies that 
analyze preferences conjointly in any other Latin American countries. 
In Section 2 we review the current literature on raspberry production in Chile and on the 
elicitation of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences using experimental procedures. In 
Section 3 we describe our sample and data collection process, respectively. In section 4 we 
detail our structural specification, and we describe our results and concluding remarks in 
sections 5 and 6, respectively. 
2.2 Raspberry production and producers’ preferences for risk and 
ambiguity aversion in Chile 
2.2.1 Chilean raspberry production and small-scale producers 
During the 1980s Yugoslavia was the largest raspberry producer in the world. However, when 
the Yugoslav War started, raspberry production was interrupted. This created a shortage on 
international markets, and corresponding opportunities for producers in other countries. As a 
result, raspberry production in Chile increased from nearly nothing in 1980s to thirty 
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thousand tons in 1990s (Domínguez, 2012). Following the cessation of hostilities, raspberry 
production in Yugoslavia began to recover in the early 2000s, ending the raspberry shortage 
on international markets. This reduced the profit of many large and medium Chilean 
raspberry producers, who then decided to switch their production towards more profitable 
crops, thus creating an opportunity for small-scale raspberry producers to expand  
(Domínguez, 2012; Jara-Rojas et al. 2016). The labor intensity and low investments that 
raspberry production requires make it attractive for small-scale producers (Toledo & Engler, 
2008). 
Today Chile is one of the largest raspberry producers and exporters worldwide. It has roughly 
16∙000 ha of raspberry and more than 21∙100 producers, most of who are located in central 
regions of Chile. Maule region alone has more than 16∙300 raspberry producers and 10∙800 ha 
dedicated to this crop. Consequently, in the central regions of Chile raspberry production 
represents an important source of income for many small-scale producers (Domínguez, 2012; 
Jara-Rojas et al., 2016). 
Producing raspberries is a risky business. High international price volatility, financial 
constraints, climate change and climate variability are some of the sources of uncertainty that 
small-scale raspberry producers must face (Challies & Murray, 2011). Consequently, 
understanding producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences can assist policy makers in 
designing policies that help producers cope with uncertainty in their production systems 
(Bocqueho et al., 2013). Nevertheless, to date there are no studies that elicit risk and 
ambiguity preferences in Chile, and, none that elicit fruit producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences in Latin America.  
2.2.2 The influence of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences on their 
decision-making  
Following Barham et al. (2014) and Klibanoff et al. (2005), we consider uncertainty as made 
up of two components: risk and ambiguity. Risk aversion occurs when decision-makers know 
the probability distribution associated with different possible outcomes and try to avoid risk 
even at the cost of a reduction in income. For example, producers who are risk averse will be 
reluctant to adopt improved technologies even if they know the probabilities of the possible 
outcomes during the adoption process; hence, they prefer to keep their current technology, 
even if that means reduced earnings (Ward & Singh, 2015). 
Ambiguity aversion arises when producers are unsure about the probability distribution 
associated with different possible outcomes. For example, small-scale producers generally 
have incomplete information about the price and yield distributions of the various crops that 
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they can plant. A producer who is ambiguity averse will be unwilling to change his/her 
current crop, even when others might offer more benefits (Warnick et al., 2011). 
Even though policy-makers could have informed guesses about the nature of producers’ risk 
and ambiguity preferences, to assume the effect of these preferences on producers decision-
making processes can lead to misperceptions and inefficiencies in policy-making process 
(Johansson-Stenman, 2008). This is also stated by Barham et al. (2014) who report that 
different agricultural decisions have different degrees of uncertainty for producers. 
Accordingly, the effect and/or magnitude of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences can 
vary according to the decision that producers are facing. Hence, producers’ risk preferences 
have different implications for different decisions: adoption of improved farm management 
practices (Wossen et al., 2015), improved varieties adoption (Liu, 2012; Ward & Singh, 2015) 
and agricultural insurances uptake (Elabed & Carter, 2015; McIntosh et al., 2015). 
As a result, numerous authors have conducted research with experimental methods to study 
producers’ risk preferences in developing countries (Alpizar et al., 2011; Barham et al., 2014; 
Bocqueho et al., 2013; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2013; Galarza & Carter, 2011; Harrison et al., 
2010; Liu, 2012; Nguyen, 2011; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). Of these studies 
only Liu (2012) and Nguyen (2011) deal with small-scale producers; Alpizar et al. (2011), 
Warnick et al. (2011), Galarza & Carter (2011) and Cardenas & Carpenter (2013) work in 
Latin America. In addition, Toledo & Engler (2008) measure risk aversion in a setting close 
to ours; however they do not use elicitation methods to measure producers’ risk preferences. 
However, there is comparatively less research on producers’ ambiguity preferences in 
developing countries (Alpizar et al., 2011; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2013; Ross et al., 2010; 
Takahashi, 2013; Ward & Singh, 2015; Warnick et al., 2011). Among these studies; Alpizar 
et al. (2011), Cardenas & Carpenter (2013), Ward & Singh (2015) and Warnick et al. (2011) 
distinguish between producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences. These studies produce mixed 
results. For instance, Alpizar et al. (2011), Ross et al. (2010) and Warnick et al. (2011) report 
significant evidence about producers’ ambiguity aversion on Costa Rica, Lao PDR and Peru, 
respectively. Yet Cardenas & Carpenter (2013), Takahashi (2013) and Ward & Singh (2015) 
do not find significant evidence of producers’ ambiguity preferences in studies covering 
Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay and Costa Rica, Indonesia and India. 
Most studies that analyze producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences focus on the influence of 
these preferences on farm-related decisions such as technology adoption, agricultural 
insurance uptake, and crop diversification (Liu, 2012; Love et al., 2014; McIntosh et al., 
2015; Nguyen, 2011; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). However, the factors that 
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influence a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences have scarcely been explored in 
developing countries. The few exceptions include Elabed & Carter (2015), Galarza & Carter 
(2011) and Harrison et al. (2010). In this paper we elicit risk and ambiguity preferences and 
we also study the socioeconomic and farm-level factors that explain variation in these 
preferences across individual smallholders. 
Two standard methods have been used to analyze producers’ risk preferences from field 
experiments: the midpoint method (Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015) and 
the structural method (Andersen et al., 2006; Bocqueho et al., 2013; Harrison et al., 2010). 
The structural method uses a maximum likelihood approach to create latent variables to 
estimate producers’ risk preferences (Bocqueho et al., 2013; Harrison & Rutström, 2008). 
According to Harrison & Rutström (2008) and Andersen et al. (2010), the structural method is 
preferred because it has advantages for multi parameter estimation, such as risk preferences 
which parameters are estimated jointly.  
The midpoint method is an analytical approach that uses a series of equations to calculate a 
producer’s risk preferences (Harrison & Rutström, 2008). This method uses information from 
risk experiments around the producer’s switching choice during risk experiment’s series to 
jointly create producer’s risk preferences’ upper and lower bounds (Bocqueho et al., 2013; 
Liu, 2012). 
According to Andersen et al. (2008), the structural method is a flexible way to estimate 
producers’ risk preferences from field experiments. We agree with that statement, considering 
that this method uses maximum likelihood to maximize producers’ risk preferences’ 
parameters, while using first and second derivatives to achieve the maximization process and 
minimizing parameter’s variance. 
Even though that midpoint and structural methods are standard to estimate risk preferences 
from field experiments, as of today only Bocqueho et al. (2013) compare the results of 
producers’ risk preferences by using both methods in a developed country context. Therefore, 
we contribute to current literature with empirical evidence about producers’ risk preferences 
estimated by using both methods in an emerging economy. 
2.3 Survey and experimental setting 
2.3.1 Survey 
The data were collected in a survey carried out from June to September 2015 in nine rural 
communes of Maule region: Molina, Romeral, Longaví, Parral, Retiro, Yerbas Buenas, Río 
Claro, Curicó and San Clemente. These communes are known in Maule for their raspberry 
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production (Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario, 2007). One the most relevant actors that 
work with small-scale berry producers in Maule region is the National Institute for 
Agricultural Development (INDAP, official acronym in Spanish), a state department that 
focuses its work on small-scale producers in Chile. We selected households for our survey 
based on INDAP’s 2011 national dataset of raspberry producers (Instituto de Desarrollo 
Agropecuario, 2011). From this dataset, we randomly selected 250 small-scale raspberry 
producers who live in rural Maule. We contacted these producers by phone to make 
appointments, and conducted field experiments and questionnaires. Of the 250 producers 
selected from INDAP’s list, 148 were excluded because they no longer produce raspberries, 
their contact information was incorrect, or they were not willing to participate. Ultimately, we 
conduct our field experiments and questionnaire with 102 producers (Figure 2-1). 
During the initial phone call, we informed producers that the session would last about ninety 
minutes, but we did not inform them about the experiment or the incentive for participating. 
As a result, a potential participants’ decision to take part in the survey was not affected by 
his/her risk and ambiguity preferences, which reduces the likelihood of selection bias. 
In addition to the experiment, we also interviewed producers according to a survey to collect 
information on their socioeconomic characteristics and the characteristics of their farm 
operations that could influence their risk and ambiguity preferences. 
 
Table 2-1 shows descriptive statistics of our sample. On average, producers are just over 51 
years of age, their households are composed of three to four members, and the household 
head has eight years of education. The average total farm size is 3.6 hectares, of which 0.5 
hectares are used to grow raspberries. In addition, fifty percent of the surveyed households 
have access to saving accounts, and 54 percent have access to agricultural loans. Also, 
producers have more than ten years of experience working with raspberries, and 19 percent of 
them are members of a farmers’ association. Finally, one-third of the producers earn off-farm 
income, and their mean monthly household expenditure is 226∙657 Chilean pesos 
(approximately € 325)3. 
                                                          
3 When the fieldwork was conducted the exchange rate was just under 700 Chilean pesos per Euro. 
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Figure 2-1. Location of sampled producers in rural Maule, Chile 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Sistema Integrado de Información Territorial (SIIT) (2014) 
 
Table 2-1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable description Mean Standard error 
Producer's age 51.25 1.30 
Household size 3.39 0.11 
Years of education  7.96 0.32 
Total raspberry area (ha) 0.50 0.05 
Total farm size (ha) 3.60 0.63 
Proportion of producers who have off-farm income 0.33 0.05 
Proportion of producers with access to saving accounts 0.50 0.05 
Proportion of producers with access to agricultural loans 0.54 0.05 
Years working with raspberry 10.65 0.64 
Proportion of producers who are members of farmers’ association 0.19 0.04 
Monthly household expenditure (Chilean pesos) 226∙657 10∙613 
Total observations 102   
Source: own calculations 
2.3.2 Structure of the experimental session 
We describe the data collection process in two sub-sections. The first sub-section describes 
the field experiments used to elicit producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, and the second 
sub-section describes the questionnaire that we used to collect information on producers’ 
socioeconomic and farm characteristics. 
To elicit producers’ risk preferences, we followed Ward & Singh’s (2015) modification of 
Tanaka et al.’s (2010) MPL experiment. This experiment has a well-defined structure, 
calibrated payouts and it is simple to use. We used another modification proposed by Ward 
and Singh to determine producers’ ambiguity preference. By combining these modified 
experiments, we were able to maintain the same general structure and rules during the 
 
Chapter II: Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences: evidence from 




experimental sessions, which increased producers’ comprehension and reduced errors and 
inconsistencies. 
The experimental session was divided into risk and ambiguity experiments; during both 
experiments, producers faced a series of binary choices (rounds) to elicit their risk and 
ambiguity preferences. The ambiguity experiment consisted of two series, each of 11 rounds, 
and the risk experiment consisted of three series, two of 14 rounds and one of seven. In total, 
producers were presented with 57 rounds. Each round was composed of a safe lottery (lottery 
A) and a risk lottery (lottery B). Whenever lottery A was selected, producers won a certain 
amount of money; however, when lottery B was selected then producers faced two possible 
outcomes, winning and losing. Compared with the safe lottery A, the winning outcome in 
lottery B involved a larger payment, and the losing outcome involved a smaller payment. 
Each producer’s task during the experimental session was to decide which lottery he/she 
would choose for every one of the 57 rounds. To minimize errors during both experiments, 
we followed Tanaka et al. (2010) and Andersen et al. (2006) and asked producers to select 
from each series the round at which they would like to switch lotteries. However, we did not 
force them to switch; in this way, we assured that producers’ answers capture their true 
preferences under risk and ambiguity scenarios. 
During the experimental session we encountered four types of behavior: producers who never 
switched, whom we consider to be strongly risk averse; producers who switched at the 
beginning, whom we consider to be strong risk seekers; farmers who switched from one 
lottery to the other according to the expected value, whom we consider to be risk neutral; and 
producers who switched back and forth among lotteries, whom we consider to be 
inconsistent4 (Bocqueho et al., 2013; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). 
2.3.3 Experiment’s incentive 
To capture producers’ true risk and ambiguity preferences, we provided participants with two 
monetary incentives. First, we gave an incentive at the beginning of the experiment. This 
incentive had two goals: to convince producers that they would earn money during this 
session, and to create an endowment effect in their minds (Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010). 
This endowment effect has crucial implications for producers’ risk preferences in losses 
domain elicitation. 
                                                          
4 One of the assumptions of risk experiments is that producers switch from lottery A to lottery B according to the 
lottery outcome. Lottery A’s outcome remains constant in all rounds, while the outcome of lottery B increases 
monotonically from round to round. It is expected that producers will eventually switch to lottery B to earn a 
larger outcome, however we do not expect producers to switch back to lottery A to earn a smaller outcome. 
Hence, we consider producers who switch back and forth between lotteries to be inconsistent (Liu, 2012; Tanaka 
et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). 
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Second, immediately after we gave the first part of the incentive to producers, we explained 
that they would earn more money according to their decisions during the session. We clarified 
that one of the ensuing rounds would be selected randomly, and we that would pay more 
money according to their decision in that round. The goal of this incentive was to encourage 
them to consider all of their decision carefully. On average, producers earned roughly 14∙000 
Chilean pesos (roughly € 20) altogether. 
To randomly select the round that determined the final pay-off, we used two black opaque 
bags. The first bag contained numbered chips that corresponded to each round of the 
experimental session. Producers selected one chip and the number selected determined the 
pay-off round. If a producer chose the safe lottery in this round, then he/she received the 
riskless amount of money declared in the series; if the producers chose the risky lottery in this 
round, then he/she was asked to draw from the second bag. This bag contained ten balls, some 
blue (winning) and some green (losing). The proportion of blue and green balls varied 
according to the probabilities stated in each series, and the color of the ball selected 
determined the amount of the final pay-off. 
2.3.4 Ambiguity experiment 
In both series of the ambiguity experiment, lottery A had a constant payment across all 
rounds. Similarly, the winning outcome in lottery B was also constant, but it involved a larger 
payment than lottery A, while the losing outcome in lottery B was smaller and decreased as 
the rounds progressed (Table A-1). To integrate the ambiguity specification into the 
experiment, during the first series of this experiment we intentionally did not reveal 
probabilities of winning and losing outcomes in lottery B. Therefore, producers needed to 
decide whether and when to switch based on a comparison of lottery A with known 
information and probabilities, and lottery B with incomplete information. 
One of the assumptions of this experiment is that producers subjectively assign probabilities 
to winning and losing outcomes in lottery B. Hence, to capture this information, after the first 
series we asked them to reveal what they thought were the probabilities associated with the 
outcomes in lottery B. This is the only series in the experimental session in which we kept 
information from producers, and to avoid that their assessments be biased by the information 
that they received in other series, we began the experimental session with this series.  
In the second series of this experiment, producers faced the same outcomes as in the first; 
however, this time we revealed the probabilities associated with winning and losing outcomes 
in lottery B. Since producers were provided with complete information in both lotteries, there 
was only risk and no ambiguity specification in this series. 
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2.3.5 Risk experiment 
In the first two series of risk experiment, the outcome in lottery A was constant across all 
rounds. Similar to lottery A, the losing outcome in lottery B was also constant. However, in 
the risk experiment the winning outcome in lottery B increased as the rounds progressed 
(Table A-2). 
The third series of the risk experiment differed from the previous series in two ways. First, 
there was no certain outcome in lottery A, as both lotteries A and B involved winning and 
losing outcomes. Second, the losing outcome in both lotteries involved real losses (Table A-
3). However, these losses were designed so that given the initial incentive provided to all 
producers, no one could lose money overall. In addition, the endowment effect created with 
the first part of the incentive was necessary for this experiment to reveal producers’ risk 
preferences in the loss domain. Producers realized that they could lose at least part of the 
initially provided incentive and, hence, had an incentive to reveal their true preferences. 
2.4 Structural specification and experimental derivation of risk and 
ambiguity preferences 
To address producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences we estimate four parameters. First, the 
curvature of the prospect value function (𝜎) reflects how a producer behaves when confronted 
with risk in the gains domain. Second, the loss aversion parameter (𝜆) captures how a 
producer behaves when facing risk in the losses domain. Third, the probability weighing 
parameter (𝛾) characterizes whether producers disproportionately give more importance to 
low probability events when facing risk. Fourth, the augmented utility parameter (𝜃) dictates 
how a producer’s utility that results from lotteries varies when he/she faces both risk and 
ambiguity scenarios. The interaction of the 𝜎, 𝜆 and 𝛾 parameters reflects producers’ risk 
preferences, and 𝜃 captures their ambiguity preferences (Harrison et al., 2010; Liu, 2012; 
Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). 
We follow Ward & Singh’s (2015) method to assess producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences, but deviate from their study in three ways. First, Ward & Singh only use the 
midpoint estimation method to assess producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, whereas we 
also use the structural method to assess their risk preferences (Bocqueho et al., 2013; Harrison 
et al., 2010). Second, Ward and Singh (2015) calculate two versions of ambiguity 
preferences: naïve and subjective. In naïve estimation, the producers’ subjective probabilities 
are assumed to be ?̂? = 1 − ?̂? = 0.5, during the first series of the ambiguity experiment. In 
subjective estimation subjective probabilities provided by producers following the first series 
of the experimental session are used. We consider that the probability assumption underlying 
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the naïve estimation is unrealistic and consequently we only carry out the subjective 
estimation. Third, Ward and Singh (2015) analyze the influence of producers’ risk and 
ambiguity preferences on the adoption of improved varieties. We focus instead on analyzing 
the socioeconomic and farm factors that influence a producer’s ambiguity and risk preference, 
and not on the effect of these preferences on a specific decision. 
2.4.1 Producers’ risk preferences estimation with the structural method 
During risk experiment, producers face scenarios with two possible outcomes, 𝑥 and 𝑦 in the 
gains and losses domains. Hence, the CPT first establishes two coefficients to differentiate 





   
𝑖𝑓 𝑥 > 0
𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0
 
(2.1) 
In (1) 𝜎 represents the curvature of the prospect value function in the gains domain. This 
preference should be greater than zero. 𝜎 < 0.5 denotes a strong concavity in the curvature of 
the prospect value function, which correlates with a strong risk aversion; 0.5 < 𝜎 < 0.9 
implies moderate risk aversion; 𝜎 = 1 implies risk neutrality; and 𝜎 > 1 implies risk seeking 
behavior. 
Furthermore, 𝜆 represents producers’ sensitivity to losses. If 𝜆 > 1, then producers are more 
sensitive to losses than gains; if 𝜆 < 1, then they are less sensitive to losses; and 𝜆 = 1 
suggests that producers are indifferent. 
We follow Tanaka et al. (2010) and calculate the decision weights based on cumulative 
probabilities, this equation is written as: 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝) = {
𝑣(𝑦) + 𝜔(𝑝) ⋅ (𝑣(𝑥) − 𝑣(𝑦))
𝜔(𝑝) ⋅ 𝑣(𝑥) + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝) ⋅ 𝑣(𝑦)
  
𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 𝑦 ≥ 0 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 0
𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0 < 𝑦
 
(2.2) 
where 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝) represents producers’ lottery utility with outcomes 𝑥 and 𝑦, and probabilities 
𝑝 and 1 − 𝑝, respectively, and 𝜔(∙) is a probability weighting function that measures whether 
a producer distorts probabilities of unlikely events. To be consistent with recent literature, we 
follow Tanaka et al. (2010), Liu (2012), Bocqueho et al. (2013) and Prelec's (1998) to define 
this function as: 
𝜔(𝑝) = exp[−(− ln 𝑝)𝛾] (2.3) 
where 𝛾 captures whether producers distort the probabilities of events when facing risk 
situations. If 𝛾 < 1, this function has an inverse s-shape form, which means that producers 
over-weigh low probability outcomes and under-weigh high probability results. When 𝛾 = 1, 
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there is no probability distortion and the function is a straight line. When 𝛾 > 1 the function 
takes a s-shape form and producers tend to under-weigh extreme events (Nguyen, 2011; 
Tanaka et al., 2010). 
We consider Δ𝑅𝑃 to be the producers’ utility difference between both lotteries. We use Δ𝑅𝑃 as 
an input variable in the following likelihood function, which is conditional to the structural 
specification: 




In equation (4), Φ represents the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution and the 𝛿𝑗 are the producers’ lottery choices. The maximum likelihood function 
for (𝜎, 𝛾, 𝜆) is: 
(?̂?, 𝛾, ?̂?) = arg max ln 𝐿𝑅𝑃(𝛿, 𝑋;  𝜎, 𝛾, 𝜆) (2.5) 
To calculate (?̂?, 𝛾, ?̂?), we implement the maximum likelihood probit method5 in STATA, 
following structural method by Harrison (2008) and Bocqueho et al. (2013). This method 
allows us to estimate producers risk preferences by using all producers’ decisions during the 
experiment. Since, decisions from the same producer could be correlated, we cluster the 
standard errors in our estimation (Andersen et al., 2010; Bocqueho et al., 2013; Harrison, 
2008)6. 
2.4.2 Producers’ risk preferences estimation with the midpoint method 
We also estimate 𝛾 and 𝜎 jointly using the midpoint method (Tanaka et al., 2010; Liu, 2012). 
This method applies equations (2.1) through (2.3) to information generated by the switching 
choices between lotteries A and B of the risk experiment. Applying these equations produces 
a set of inequalities for each series; solving for 𝛾 and 𝜎 in these inequalities, we estimate 
parameters’ upper and lower bounds. 
Since there are many values of 𝛾 and 𝜎 that satisfy these inequalities, we use the combination 
of these parameters that maximizes producers’ expected utility from both lotteries. For 
example, consider, a producer who in the risk section switches at choice five in series one and 
at choice six in series two; in this case we must solve the following inequalities: 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 1 {
0𝜎 + exp[−(− ln 1)𝛾] ∗ (1200𝜎 − 0𝜎) > 600𝜎 + exp[−(− ln 0.1)𝛾] ∗ (4900𝜎 − 600𝜎)  𝑖𝑓 𝛿𝑗 = 𝐴
0𝜎 + exp[−(− ln 1)𝛾] ∗ (1200𝜎 − 0𝜎) < 600𝜎 + exp[−(− ln 0.1)𝛾] ∗ (5650𝜎 − 600𝜎)  𝑖𝑓 𝛿𝑗 = 𝐵
 
                                                          
5 To be consistent with recent literature, we used a probit model for our calculations. The results of a logit estimation (available 
from the authors) are similar.  
6 Since during the risk experiment, each producer faces a total of 35 decisions to make (rounds) and we cluster by producers. 
Altogether we have a total of 3255 observations in 93 clusters. 
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0𝜎 + exp[−(− ln 1)𝛾] ∗ (4000𝜎 − 0𝜎) > 500𝜎 + exp[−(− ln 0.7)𝛾] ∗ (6900𝜎 − 500𝜎)  𝑖𝑓 𝛿𝑘 = 𝐴
0𝜎 + exp[−(− ln 1)𝛾] ∗ (4000𝜎 − 0𝜎) < 500𝜎 + exp[−(− ln 0.7)𝛾] ∗ (7300𝜎 − 500𝜎)  𝑖𝑓 𝛿𝑘 = 𝐵
 
In these inequalities, 𝛾 and 𝜎 are the arguments that we jointly maximize to quantify the 
producer’s risk preferences. 𝛿𝑗 and 𝛿𝑘 represent a producers’ lottery choice regarding the 
switching round in series one and two of the risk experiment, respectively. In this example, 
the values for 𝛾 and 𝜎 that maximize utility are 1 and 0.91 for series one, and 1 and 0.77 for 
series two; hence, the mean values are 1 and 0.84 for 𝜎 and 𝛾, respectively. 
We calculate 𝜆 from the third series of the risk section. Since we know producers’ switching 
choice, and equations (2.1) and (2.2), solving for 𝜆 produces the loss aversion parameter 
equation (2.6) (Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). Since the probability for 
every outcome in lottery B is the same (𝑝 = 1 − 𝑝 = 0.5), 𝛾 does not play a role in this 









2.4.3 Producers’ ambiguity preference estimation 
Following Ward & Singh (2015), we also use the midpoint method to determine producers’ 
ambiguity preference. Therefore, we assume that a producer’s utilities at the switching 
choices of both lotteries are equal; in other words: 
𝑈(𝑥𝐴) = [𝑈(𝑥𝑗,𝐵, 𝑦𝑗,𝐵; ?̂?, 1 − ?̂?; 𝛾, 𝜎)]
𝜃 (2.7) 
where 𝑥 and 𝑦 are winning and losing outcomes, respectively, and 𝑗 represents switching 
choice during series one, in which we did not inform producers about the probabilities of 
outcomes in lottery B. Hence, to reveal a producer’s subjective probability after the first 
series we asked him/her what he/she thinks are the probabilities associated with winning (?̂?) 
and losing (1 − ?̂?) in lottery B, and we use these probabilities in equation (2.7). 
Consequently, 𝜃 captures a producer’s ambiguity preference based on his/her choice of an 
ambiguity lottery with incomplete information over a safe lottery with complete information. 
𝜆 only arises when analyzing risk preferences in the loss domain; since we analyze producers’ 
ambiguity preference on gains domain, we do not calculate a loss aversion parameter. 
To calculate producers’ utility based on the second series of the ambiguity experiment, we 
also use equation (2.7). Since we reveal the probabilities associated with winning and losing 
outcomes to the producers, 𝜃 does not play a role in this series. Furthermore, since outcomes 
for lotteries A and B are equal in both series, we can compare a producer’s utility in both 
series at switching choices 𝑗 and 𝑘 for the first and second series, respectively. Then, solving 
for 𝜃 we find the equation that captures the producer’s ambiguity preference: 
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ln 𝑈(𝑥𝑘,𝐵, 𝑦𝑘,𝐵; 𝑝, 1 − 𝑝; 𝛾, 𝜎)
ln 𝑈(𝑥𝑗,𝐵, 𝑦𝑗,𝐵; ?̂?, 1 − ?̂?; 𝛾, 𝜎)
 
(2.8) 
𝜃 > 1 implies that the utility that results from the lottery is larger when ambiguity is absent, 
i.e. that the producer is ambiguity averse. If 𝜃 = 1 then the producer derives the same utility 
from both series, i.e. he/she is ambiguity neutral. If 𝜃 < 1 then the utility from the lottery is 
larger when ambiguity is present, i.e. the producer is an ambiguity seeker.  
To identify the factors that influence producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, we follow 
Harrison & Rutström (2008) and Ward & Singh (2015) and conduct probit and OLS models 
to regress these preferences on a set of producers’ socioeconomic and farm characteristics. 
According to the current literature, we expect that producer’s assets decrease producer’s risk 
aversion. Hence, we include available land to produce and off-farm income as covariates 
(Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015). Also, we expect that producers who 
are more risk averse tend to look for risk-sharing institutions, such as farmers’ associations 
(Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2013). In addition, we include other producer’s characteristics that 
could decrease producers’ risk and ambiguity aversion, such as years of education, access to 
agricultural loans, producer’s experience working with raspberry, and household expenditure 
as a proxy for producers’ household income (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2013; Warnick et al., 
2011). Furthermore, we include producer’s gender to identify if there are differences of 
producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences between male and female producers (Ward & 
Singh, 2015). Finally, we include additional characteristics that we expect them to increase 
producers’ risk and ambiguity aversion, such as the producer’s age and household size 
(Alpizar et al., 2011; Harrison et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2010; Warnick et al., 2011). Although 
many studies find no evidence that household expenditure, household size, and available land 
influence producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, we believe that they might have an 
influence in the Chilean context (Liu, 2012; Ward & Singh, 2015; Warnick et al., 2011). 
2.5 Results 
Following Hirschauer et al. (2014), inconsistent producers can bias the mean and variance of 
producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences estimates. In our data, nine producers show 
inconsistent behavior and are excluded from the analysis. 
In the following we first present the results of the estimation of producers’ risk preferences. 
Then we show how these estimates differ depending on whether they are produced using the 
midpoint or the structural method. Later we present the results for the regression of 
producers’ risk preferences on a set of producers’ characteristics. Finally, we present the 
results for producers’ ambiguity preference and the regression of producers’ ambiguity 
preference on producer specific socioeconomic and farm characteristics. 
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2.5.1 Producers’ risk preferences estimation method comparison 
Our estimates for producers’ risk preferences parameters (𝛾, 𝜆 and 𝜎) are shown in Table 2-2. 
We find with the structural method that producers’ risk preferences are significantly different 
from zero (𝑝 < 0.001), and that 𝜆 > 1 and 𝜎 < 1, both at 99 percent significance level (𝑝 <
0.001). This implies that producers are risk and loss averse. 
We find that 𝛾 = 0.952, with a 95 percent confidence interval of 0.791 – 1.111. Since this 
estimate is not different from one (𝑝 = 0.56), we conclude that on average, producers do not 
distort the probabilities of unlikely extreme events. This behavior is consistent with other 
theories in the literature that assume linear probability weighing among producers (Galarza, 
2009; Harrison et al., 2010)7. Regarding loss aversion, we find that 𝜆 = 2.06, with a 95 
percent confidence interval of 1.607 – 2.517. This suggests that producers are roughly twice 
as sensitive to losses as they are to gains. This result is consistent with those of Liu (2012) 
(𝜆 = 3.47) and Nguyen (2011) (𝜆 = 3.255). We also find that 𝜎 = 0.214, with a 95 percent 
confidence interval of 0.199 – 0.228. This points to a strong risk aversion among producers 
(Andersen et al., 2010), and is similar to findings by Harrison et al. (2010) (𝜎 = 0.464), 
Tanaka et al. (2010) (𝜎 = 0.59) and Liu (2012) (𝜎 = 0.48). 
Table 2-2. Comparison of producers’ risk preferences estimates 
 
Structural method  Midpoint method 
  




𝛽0 = 1 
 




𝛽0 = 1 
γ 0.952*** (0.082) 0.791 1.111 0.56  0.849*** (0.03) 0.787 0.910 0.00 
λ 2.062*** (0.232) 1.607 2.517 0.00  3.543*** (0.28) 2.986 4.100 0.00 
σ 0.214*** (0.007) 0.199 0.228 0.00  0.659*** (0.04) 0.583 0.734 0.00 
θ       1.497*** (0.24) 1.020 1.973 0.04 
Source: own calculations; Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Furthermore, like Bocqueho et al. (2013) we find that producers’ risk preferences estimates 
from both methods are similar. However, there are three important differences. First, that the 
estimate of 𝜎 from the structural method (𝜎 = 0.214) is lower than that from the midpoint 
method (𝜎 = 0.659). Hence, while our result for 𝜎 with the structural method suggests strong 
risk aversion, our result with the midpoint method suggests only moderate risk aversion. 
Second, 𝜆 increases from 2.062 with the structural method to 3.543 with the midpoint 
method. Hence, according to the midpoint method producers are on average three and a half 
times more sensitive to losses as they are to gains. Further, both changes on 𝜎 and 𝜆 increase 
the asymmetry between producers’ risk preferences in gains and loses domains.  
                                                          
7 Expected Utility Theory (EUT) is one of the most prominent theories used to address producers’ risk preferences, and it 
assumes linear probability weighing among producers (Bocqueho et al., 2013; Harrison & Rutström, 2008; Tanaka et al., 2010). 
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Third, the estimate of 𝛾 is similar for both estimation methods. However, according to the 
results of the structural method 𝛾 does not differ from one (𝑝 = 0.56), while with the 
midpoint method it is statistically smaller than one (𝑝 < 0.01). Hence, the structural estimate 
indicates that producers do not disproportionately distort the probabilities of unlikely events 
but the midpoint method estimate indicates that they over-weigh unlikely events (Bocqueho et 
al., 2013; Liu, 2012; Ward & Singh, 2015). Our estimate of 𝛾 with the midpoint method is 
similar to estimates by Liu (2012), Tanaka et al. (2010) and Ward & Singh (2015), who find 
that 𝛾 = 0.69, 0.74 and 0.736, respectively. 
2.5.2 Producers’ risk preferences determinants 
In Table 2-3 we present the results of the probit and OLS regressions estimations of 
producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences on their socioeconomic and farm characteristics 
respectively. First, we find that 𝛾 increases with producers’ age, education and available land 
to produce. Hence, older, more educated producers who farm more land are more likely to 
under-weigh unlikely events. In addition, producers who are members of a farmers’ 
association and have larger household expenditures are more likely to over-weigh unlikely 
events. These results are similar to those of Galarza (2009) who finds that education has a 
significant influence on the size of the probability weighing parameter. We are not aware of 
any other studies that analyze the influence of membership in a farmers’ association on risk 
preferences, but one possible explanation is that producers who over-weigh unlikely events 
consider farmers’ associations as an informal means of risk sharing. Moreover, we are not 
aware of previous studies that find significant effects of household expenditure, household 
size, available land to produce, and producer’s age on 𝛾. 
Second, as expected we find that producers’ available land correlates with less loss aversion. 
In addition, 𝜆 is positively correlated with producer’s age. However, the size of this effect is 
small. These results are similar to those of Liu (2012) who also reports that available land 
correlates with less loss aversion among producers, and Tanaka et al. (2010) who also show 
that producer’s age is correlated with 𝜆. 
Third, our results show that producers’ age and agricultural loans are associated with stronger 
risk aversion 𝜎. Also, producers with larger household expenditure are less risk averse. Our 
results for this parameter are similar to Harrison et al. (2010) and Alpizar et al. (2011), who 
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Table 2-3. Regression estimates of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences on their socioeconomic and farm 
characteristics 
Variable description Coefficient 
 
Std. Err. 
Producer’s risk preferences    
γ Constant 0.554  (0.692) 
 
Producer's age 0.021 * (0.012) 
 
Female -0.129  (0.148) 
 
Household size -0.091  (0.103) 
 
Agricultural loans (1 = yes) 0.331  (0.341) 
 
Years studied 0.056 * (0.031) 
 
Total available land 0.024 ** (0.010) 
 
Farmers’ association member -0.359 ** (0.177) 
 
Off farm income 0.013  (0.243) 
 
Monthly household expenditure (CLP 100∙000) -0.302 ** (0.149) 
λ Constant 0.884  (2.985) 
 
Producer's age 0.059 * (0.032) 
 
Female -0.560  (0.672) 
 
Household size -0.135  (0.336) 
 
Agricultural loans (1 = yes) -0.470  (1.207) 
 
Years studied 0.091  (0.161) 
 
Total available land -0.125 *** (0.040) 
 
Farmers’ association member 1.887  (1.209) 
 
Off farm income -0.971  (0.740) 
 
Monthly household expenditure (CLP 100∙000) -0.309  (0.389) 
σ Constant 0.178 * (0.102) 
 
Producer's age -0.002 * (0.001) 
 
Female -0.012  (0.023) 
 
Household size 0.013  (0.012) 
 
Agricultural loans (1 = yes) -0.060 * (0.032) 
 
Years studied 0.008  (0.007) 
 
Total available land 0.002  (0.001) 
 
Farmers’ association member -0.028  (0.031) 
 
Off farm income -0.045  (0.038) 
 
Monthly household expenditure (CLP 100∙000) 0.029 *** (0.010) 
   
 
  Model p-value 0.002   
Producer’s ambiguity preferences    
θ Constant 0.096  (1.531) 
 Age -0.016  (0.019) 
 Female -1.130 * (0.560) 
 Household size 0.373 * (0.218) 
 Agricultural loans (1 = yes) -0.966  (0.614) 
 Total land available -0.052  (0.043) 
 Farmers' association member -0.773  (0.627) 
 Monthly household expenditure (CLP 100∙000) 0.480 ** (0.237) 
 Years working with raspberry 0.099 ** (0.042) 
     
 Model p-value 0.080   
 r2 0.068   
Source: own calculations; Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.5.3 Producers’ ambiguity preferences 
Our estimate of 𝜃 is 1.497, with a 95 percent confidence interval of 1.02 – 1.97 (Table 2). 
Since 𝜃 is significantly larger than one (𝑝 = 0.041), producers are, on average, ambiguity 
averse. This confirms findings by Alpizar et al. (2011) and Warnick et al. (2011), who report 
ambiguity aversion among small-scale producers in Costa Rica and Peru, respectively. 
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In Table 2-3 we report the results of regressing 𝜃 on a set of producers’ socioeconomic and 
farm characteristics. Our results show that on average female producers are less ambiguity 
averse than male producers. Contrary to our expectations, household expenditure and years of 
experience working with raspberry are positively correlated with ambiguity aversion, as is 
household size. Cardenas & Carpenter (2013) also find a significant effect of gender on 
ambiguity preferences, however they report the opposite effect. This might be due to the fact 
that Cardenas & Carpenter study urban individuals from the capital cities of six countries in 
Latin America, while we study small producers in rural Chile. 
In addition, we find that producers from larger households are more ambiguity averse. 
Warnick et al. (2011) also find a significant effect for household size on producers’ ambiguity 
preference. Cardenas & Carpenter (2013) analyze the effect of producers’ income, and 
Warnick et al. (2011) consider the influence of producers’ experience on their ambiguity 
preference; however they do not find that these variables have significant effects. 
Furthermore, their studies are carried out in developed countries. To the best of our 
knowledge we are the first to analyze factors that influence ambiguity aversion in a 
developing country. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Our research contributes to the understanding of small raspberry producers’ decision-making 
process by analyzing their risk and ambiguity preferences in rural Maule. We highlight three 
main findings. First, producers are strongly risk averse, and there is an asymmetry between 
the gains and losses domains, implying that on average producers do not behave in the same 
way for rewards and for penalizations. Producers put more effort into avoiding losses than 
into realizing gains (Bocqueho et al., 2013). In addition, we find that producers derive less 
utility from the experiments in which ambiguity is present, which implies that producers are 
on average ambiguity averse. 
Second, our results show that the midpoint and structural methods produce different estimates 
of producers’ risk preferences. The results from the midpoint method suggest that producers 
are less risk averse, and that the asymmetry between risk aversion in gains and losses domains 
is larger, than the results from the structural method. These different estimates have obvious 
connotations for agricultural policies and strategies design. 
Third, we find that many producers’ socioeconomic and farm characteristics are correlated 
with their risk and ambiguity preferences. According to our estimates, age, membership in a 
farmers’ association membership, and current agricultural loans are positively correlated with 
a producer’s risk and loss aversion. Years of education, total available land, and monthly 
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household expenditure are negatively correlated with risk and loss aversion. We also find that 
male producers, household size, monthly household expenditure, and years of experience 
working with raspberry are positively correlated with ambiguity aversion. 
Possible venues for future research are to apply different methods to measure producers’ risk 
and ambiguity preferences, such as Harrison et al.'s (2010) mixture method to estimate risk 
preferences, and Cardenas & Carpenter's (2013) method to estimate ambiguity preference. 
Applying Tanaka et al.’s (2010) method for measuring time preferences could generate 
further insights into producers’ behavior under uncertainty. Ultimately, research such as this 
can help public and private stakeholders design and improve policies and products that help 
smallholders in Chile deal with risk and uncertainty. 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Dr. Géraldine Bocquého, Dr. Florence Jacquet and Prof. Dr. Arnaud 
Reynaud for kindly providing their STATA code. This research has been funded by the 
Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service, DAAD) 
and the Adapting Agriculture to Climate Change program (A2C2) of the Universidad de 
Talca, Chile. 
References 
Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F., & Naranjo, M. A. (2011). The effect of ambiguous risk, and 
coordination on farmers’ adaptation to climate change — A framed field experiment. 
Ecological Economics, 70(12), 2317–2326. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.07.004 
Andersen, S., Fountain, J., Harrison, G. W., & Rutström, E. E. (2014). Estimating subjective 
probabilities. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 48(3), 207–229. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-014-9194-z 
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. (2006). Elicitation using multiple 
price list formats. Experimental Economics, 9(4), 383–405. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-7055-6 
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. E. (2008). Eliciting Risk and Time 
Preferences. Econometrica, 76(3), 583–618. JOUR. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40056458 
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. E. (2010). Preference heterogeneity 
in experiments: Comparing the field and laboratory. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 73(2), 209–224. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.006 
Barham, B. L., Chavas, J.-P., Fitz, D., Salas, V. R., & Schechter, L. (2014). The roles of risk 
 
Chapter II: Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences: evidence from 




and ambiguity in technology adoption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
97(0), 204–218. Journal Article. 
http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.06.014 
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(3), 395–407. Journal Article. 
Bocqueho, G., Jacquet, F., & Reynaud, A. (2013). Expected utility or prospect theory 
maximisers? Assessing farmers’ risk behaviour from field-experiment data. European 
Review of Agricultural Economics, 41(1), 135–172. http://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbt006 
Cardenas, J. C., & Carpenter, J. (2013). Risk attitudes and economic well-being in Latin 
America. Journal of Development Economics, 103, 52–61. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.01.008 
Challies, E. R. T., & Murray, W. E. (2011). The interaction of Global Value Chains and rural 
livelihoods: the case of smallholders Raspberry growers in Chile. Journal of Agrarian 
Change, 11(1), 29–59. 
Domínguez, A. (2012). Chilean Raspberry Industry. In 8Th IRO Conference (p. 28). 
Elabed, G., & Carter, M. R. (2015). Compound-risk aversion, ambiguity and the willingness 
to pay for microinsurance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Journal 
Article. 
Galarza, F. (2009). Choices under Risk in Rural Peru (Unpublished Work). Working Paper 
17708. Munich, Germany: Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 
Galarza, F., & Carter, M. R. (2011). Risk preferences and demand for insurance in Peru: A 
field experiment (Working paper). Lima, Perú. 
Gobierno de Chile. (2013). Plan de adaptación al cambio climático del sector 
silvoagropecuario. Santiago, Chile. Retrieved from 
http://www.mma.gob.cl/1304/articles-
55879_InstrumentoFinalCC_Silvoagropecuario.pdf 
Handschuch, C., Wollni, M., & Villalobos, P. (2013). Adoption of food safety and quality 
standards among Chilean raspberry producers - Do smallholders benefit? Food Policy, 
40, 64–73. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.02.002 
Harrison, G. W. (2008). Maximum likelihood estimation of utility functions using Stata. 
University of Central Florida, Department of Economics, College of Business 
Administration. Retrieved from 
http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/jalevy/protected/HarrisonSTATML.pdf 
Harrison, G. W., Humphrey, S. J., & Verschoor, A. (2010). Choice under Uncertainty: 
Evidence from Ethiopia, India and Uganda. The Economic Journal, 120(543), 80–104. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02303.x 
 
Chapter II: Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences: evidence from 




Harrison, G. W., & Rutström, E. E. (2008). Risk aversion in the laboratory. Research in 
Experimental Economics, 12(8), 41–196. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(08)00003-
3 
Hirschauer, N., Musshoff, O., Maart-Noelck, S. C., & Gruener, S. (2014). Eliciting risk 
attitudes–how to avoid mean and variance bias in Holt-and-Laury lotteries. Applied 
Economics Letters, 21(1), 35–38. Journal Article. 
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. The American 
Economic Review, 92(5), 1644–1655. Journal Article. 
Ihli, H. J., & Musshoff, O. (2013). Investment Behavior of Ugandan Smallholder Farmers: 
An Experimental Analysis (Report). GlobalFood Discussion Papers. 
Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario. (2007). Plan Nacional de Competitividad de 
Frambuesa de Exportación para la agricultura familiar campesina. Santiago, Chile. 
Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario. (2011). Servicio de Asistencia Técnica (Dataset). 
(INDAP, Ed.). Santiago: Ministerio de Agricultura. 
Jara-Rojas, R., Bravo-Ureta, B., Solís, D., & Martínez, D. (2016). Production efficiency and 
commercialization channels among small-scale farmers: Evidence for raspberry 
production in Central Chile. In Southern Agricultural Economics Association (pp. 1–
26). 
Johansson-Stenman, O. (2008). Mad cows, terrorism and junk food: should public policy 
reflect perceived or objective risks? Journal of Health Economics, 27(2), 234–48. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2007.04.004 
Klibanoff, P., Marinacci, M., Applicata, M., & Torino, U. (2005). A Smooth Model of 
Decision Making Under, 73(6), 1849–1892. http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.395600 
Liu, E. M. (2012). Time to Change What to Sow: Risk Preferences and Technology Adoption 
Decisions of Cotton Farmers in China. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1386–
1403. Journal Article. http://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00295 
Love, A., Magnan, N., & Colson, G. J. (2014). Male and Female Risk Preferences and Maize 
Technology Adoption in Kenya. 
McIntosh, C., Povell, F., & Sadoulet, E. (2015). Utility, Risk, and Demand for Incomplete 
Insurance: Lab Experiments with Guatemalan Cooperatives. Journal Article. 
Mobarak, A. M., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (2013). Informal risk sharing, index insurance, and 
risk taking in developing countries. The American Economic Review, 103(3), 375–380. 
Journal Article. 
Morton, J. F. (2007). The impact of climate change on smallholder and subsistence 
agriculture. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(50), 19680–19685. 
Journal Article. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701855104 
 
Chapter II: Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences: evidence from 




Nguyen, Q. (2011). Does nurture matter: Theory and experimental investigation on the effect 
of working environment on risk and time preferences. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
43(3), 245–270. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-011-9130-4 
Prelec, D. (1998). The Probability Weighting Function. Econometrica, 66(3), 497–527. 
Ross, N., Santos, P., & Capon, T. (2010). Risk, ambiguity and the adoption of new 
technologies: Experimental evidence from a developing economy (Journal Article). 
Unpublished manuscript. 
Sistema Integrado de Información Territorial (SIIT). (2014). Mapoteca. Map, Santiago, Chile: 
Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. 
Takahashi, K. (2013). The roles of risk and ambiguity in the adoption of the system of rice 
intensification (SRI): evidence from Indonesia. Food Security, 5(4), 513–524. Journal 
Article. http://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-013-0270-z 
Tanaka, T., Camerer, C. F., & Nguyen, Q. (2010). Risk and Time Preferences: Linking 
Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam. The American Economic 
Review, 100(1), 557–571. Journal Article. http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.1.557 
Toledo, R., & Engler, A. (2008). Risk preferences estimation for small raspberry producers in 
the Bío-Bío Region, Chile. Chilean Journal of Agricultural Research, 68(2), 175–182. 
http://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-58392008000200007 
Universidad de Chile. (2006). Estudio de la variabilidad climática en Chile para el siglo XXI, 
71. 
Ward, P. S., & Singh, V. (2015). Using Field Experiments to Elicit Risk and Ambiguity 
Preferences: Behavioural Factors and the Adoption of New Agricultural Technologies in 
Rural India. The Journal of Development Studies, 1–18. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.989996 
Warnick, J. C. E., Escobal, J., & Laszlo, S. C. (2011). Ambiguity aversion and portfolio 
choice in small-scale Peruvian farming. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 
11. Journal Article. 
Wossen, T., Berger, T., & Di Falco, S. (2015). Social capital, risk preference and adoption of 
improved farm land management practices in Ethiopia. Agricultural Economics, 46(1), 
81–97. http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12142 
 
Chapter II: Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences: evidence from 





Table A-1. Payoff schedule for ambiguity experiment (in Chilean pesos) 
Round Lottery A Lottery B+ 
Expected payoff 
difference* 
Series 1 and 2 Probability = 1 Probability = 0.5+ Probability = 0.5+  
1 2200 4400 2200 -1100 
2 2200 4400 1800 -900 
3 2200 4400 1400 -700 
4 2200 4400 1100 -550 
5 2200 4400 850 -425 
6 2200 4400 750 -375 
7 2200 4400 650 -325 
8 2200 4400 550 -275 
9 2200 4400 400 -200 
10 2200 4400 200 -100 
11 2200 4400 0 0 
Source: own calculations 
* Expected payoff difference (expected utility of lottery A – expected utility of lottery B) is not shown to producers. 
+ The producers were not informed about these probabilities during the first series of the ambiguity section. 
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Table A-2. Payoff schedule for the first two series of risk experiment (in Chilean pesos) 
Round Lottery A Lottery B 
Expected payoff 
difference* 
Series 1 Probability = 1 Probability = 0.1 Probability = 0.9  
1 1200 3100 600 350 
2 1200 3400 600 320 
3 1200 3850 600 275 
4 1200 4300 600 230 
5 1200 4900 600 170 
6 1200 5650 600 95 
7 1200 6700 600 -10 
8 1200 7600 600 -100 
9 1200 8650 600 -205 
10 1200 10200 600 -360 
11 1200 12500 600 -590 
12 1200 16000 600 -940 
13 1200 21750 600 -1515 
14 1200 33600 600 -2700 
Series 2 Probability = 1 Probability = 0.7 Probability = 0.3  
1 4000 5600 500 -70 
2 4000 5700 500 -140 
3 4000 6000 500 -350 
4 4000 6200 500 -490 
5 4000 6500 500 -700 
6 4000 6900 500 -980 
7 4000 7300 500 -1260 
8 4000 7700 500 -1540 
9 4000 8200 500 -1890 
10 4000 8700 500 -2240 
11 4000 9500 500 -2800 
12 4000 10500 500 -3500 
13 4000 11900 500 -4480 
14 4000 13700 500 -5740 
Source: Own calculations 
* Expected payoff difference (expected utility of lottery A – expected utility of lottery B) is not shown to producers. 
 
Table A-3. Payoff schedule for third series of risk experiment (in Chilean pesos) 
Round 
Lottery A Lottery B Expected payoff 
difference* Probability = 
0.5 
Probability = 0.5 Probability = 
0.5 
Probability = 0.5 
1 10000 - 2000 12000 - 8500 2250 
2 2000 - 2000 12000 - 8500 -1750 
3 500 - 2000 12000 - 8500 -2500 
4 500 - 4000 12000 - 6800 -4350 
5 500 - 4000 12000 - 6800 -4350 
6 500 - 4000 12000 - 5900 -4800 
7 500 - 4000 12000 - 4650 -5425 
Source: Own calculations 
* Expected payoff difference (expected utility of lottery A – expected utility of lottery B) is not shown to the producers. 
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3 The role of spatial patterns and producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences on small-scale agricultural technology adoption 
Abstract 
Raspberry production is the main source of income for more than twenty thousand Chilean 
small-scale producers. Daily, these producers face market, financial, and climate constraints; 
they must cope with uncertainty in their production system. The Maule region, where most of 
Chilean raspberry production is located, is vulnerable to climate variability and climate 
change effects. To help producers cope with this vulnerability, the Chilean government 
developed a plan to adapt agriculture to climate change and climate variability. In this plan, 
producers’ technology adoption plays a key role in mitigating climate effects on agriculture. 
However, there are no previous studies in Chile that analyze technology adoption decisions of 
small-scale raspberry producers. Hence, our research focuses on adoption of drip irrigation 
and improved varieties as technologies that could help producers to cope with climate effects. 
We use a spatial Durbin probit model to identify how producers’ socioeconomic and farm 
characteristics, risk and ambiguity preferences, and spatial patterns influence their decisions 
to adoption technology. Our findings confirm that risk and ambiguity averse producers are 
less likely to adopt improved technologies. Also, a producer’s decision to adopt, his/her 
socioeconomic characteristics and risk and ambiguity preferences generate spatial spill-over 
effects that influence neighboring producers’ adoption decisions. 
3.1 Introduction 
Technology adoption is a key component for producers to cope with uncertainty in their 
production systems. Moreover, technology adoption is also of particular relevance for small-
scale producers to face and adapt to uncertain situations (Alpizar et al., 2011; Bhargava et al., 
2015; Ross et al., 2010; Tambo & Abdoulaye, 2011). According to previous studies, a 
producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics, and his/her risk and ambiguity 
preferences influence a producer’s decision to adopt (Barham et al., 2014; Liu, 2012; Ward & 
Singh, 2015; Wossen et al., 2015). In addition, some authors demonstrate that a producer’s 
farm-related decisions are not random within a territory, but rather there are spatial patterns 
that influence a producer’s decision to adopt. This means that a producer’s attitude towards a 
technology, and his/her characteristics generate spatial spill-over effects that influence 
neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt the same technology (Bhargava et al., 2015; 
Bichler et al., 2005; Edirisinghe et al., 2013; Wollni & Andersson, 2014). 
Kane (1999), Minetti et al. (2003) and Universidad de Chile (2006) discuss Chilean 
vulnerability towards climate variability and climate change, and report that the Chilean 
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northern and central regions show a decreasing rainfall trend based on historic rainfall 
records. This rainfall reduction, in combination with the variability caused by El Niño 
Southern Oscillation (ENSO), increases producers’ uncertainty in their production systems. 
The Chilean government is aware of this situation and created a national plan to adapt 
forestry, farming and livestock development to climate change and climate variability 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2013). In this plan, the Chilean government details strategies to adapt 
agriculture to climate change and climate variability for the oncoming years. Producers’ 
adoption of improved varieties to resist drought and diseases, water saving irrigation 
technology and other related practices are key components of these strategies. Consequently, 
understanding a producer’s decision to adopt these technologies is relevant for the Chilean 
government and other policy-makers to adapt agriculture to climate change and climate 
variability. 
Since small-scale producers face stiffer constraints to adapt to changes and shocks, compared 
with medium and large-scale producers, we focus on small-scale raspberry producers in the 
rural areas of the Maule region, in central Chile (Handschuch et al., 2013; Morton, 2007). In 
addition, we focus on raspberry production because as of today, Chile is one of the largest 
raspberry producers worldwide; in this country raspberry exports represent three percent of 
the total fruit exports (Jara-Rojas et al., 2016). Furthermore, the Chilean raspberry market is 
mostly composed of small-scale producers. Currently there are more than twenty thousand 
producers to whom raspberry production represents an important portion of their income. The 
Maule region alone agglomerates more than sixteen thousand producers (Domínguez, 2012). 
Despite the relevance of raspberry production for small-scale producers and their families in 
central regions of Chile, as of today, there have been no previous studies that analyze these 
producers’ decision to adopt technology. 
In our study, we use a spatial Durbin probit model to understand raspberry a producer’s 
decision to adopt drip irrigation and improved raspberry varieties in rural Maule. To analyze a 
producer’s decision to adopt, we consider that his/her decision is influenced by three 
components: producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics, risk and ambiguity 
preferences and spatial patterns. Ultimately, this research provides inputs that could help to 
support and/or redefine current agricultural policies, and help producers to cope with 
uncertainty in their production systems. 
Our results confirm that a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences, except for the 
probability weighing parameter, constraint a producer’s decisions to adopt technology. In 
addition, a producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics, and his/her risk and ambiguity 
preferences generate spatial spill-over effects, which also influence neighboring producers’ 
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adoption decisions. Finally, contrary to what the current literature suggests, we find that a 
producer’s decision to adopt can constraint neighboring producers’ technology adoption 
decisions. 
We contribute to the current literature in three ways. First, we are not aware of previous 
studies that combine spatial methods and a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences that 
stem from a direct elicitation with field experiments to analyze a producer’s decision to adopt. 
Second, since there is mixed evidence about the effect of a producer’s risk and ambiguity 
preferences on technology adoption in developing countries, we contribute with empirical 
evidence about how these preferences influence a producers’ adoption decisions. And third, 
we explore spatial dependence among producers, and whether a producer’s socioeconomic 
and farm characteristics, and his/her risk and ambiguity preferences generate spatial spill-over 
effects that influence neighboring producers’ adoption decisions. 
Our study is structured as follows: in the next section, we conduct a literature review on 
raspberry production in Chile, the role of spatial patterns, and a producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences on agricultural technology adoption. In section three, we describe our sample and 
dataset, continuing with our econometric results in section four. Finally, our concluding 
remarks are detailed in section five. 
3.2 Raspberry production, producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences, 
and spatial patterns influence on technology adoption 
3.2.1 Raspberry production in Chile 
Raspberry production due to its low investment and production costs, and high labor intensity 
is an attractive alternative for small-scale producers (Toledo & Engler, 2008). As of today, in 
Chile there are more than 16∙000 hectares dedicated to raspberry, this area is in hands of more 
than 21∙100 producers, to who raspberry production represents an important part of their 
income (Domínguez, 2012; Jara-Rojas et al. 2016). Also, due to the current favorable soils 
and climatic conditions, the raspberry production in Chile is concentrated in the central 
regions. The Maule region alone has 10∙800 ha dedicated to produce raspberry, distributed 
among approximately 16∙300 producers (Domínguez, 2012; Jara-Rojas et al., 2016). 
However, producing raspberry is not an easy task. Small-scale producers face many sources 
of uncertainty in their production systems: credit and financial constraints, national and 
international market price volatility, and climate variability and climate change effects, 
among others (Challies & Murray, 2011). Consequently, to cope with production uncertainty, 
we analyze a producer’s decision to adopt two technologies: adoption of improved raspberry 
varieties and drip irrigation. Regarding adoption of improved raspberry varieties, these 
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varieties have enhanced resistance to diseases and are adapted to other adverse situations, 
which are desirable features for producers (Jennings & McGregor, 1988). In addition, we 
analyze the adoption of drip irrigation as a water saving irrigation technique that could help 
producers cope with climate variability effects. Furthermore, the adoption and combination of 
both technologies would boost production. As Morales et al. (2013) show, the use of Heritage 
as an improved raspberry variety in combination with drip irrigation systems in Chile could 
increase yields 106.1 percent, compared to non-irrigated raspberry crops.  
Nevertheless, adopting drip irrigation is not an easy process for small-scale producers. 
According to Lavín & Matsuya (2004), in Chile to install a drip irrigation system on a half 
hectare of fruit crops requires an investment of approximately 2∙225 Euros. Therefore, given 
the credit and financial constraints that many small-scale producers face, it is hard for them to 
invest this amount of money without adequate incentives, subsidies or assistance 
(Handschuch et al., 2013). 
Lastly, a producer’s adoption of drip irrigation and improved varieties is in line with the 
Chilean government priority strategic plan to adapt agriculture to climate variability and 
climate change (Gobierno de Chile, 2013). This plan remarks on the importance of producers’ 
technology adoption for local and regional governments and other policy-makers. However, 
despite the benefits of adopting these technologies, and even though both are part of a 
national strategic priority, as of today there are no previous studies that analyze a producer’s 
adoption of these technologies with Chilean small-scale producers. 
Therefore, in this research we base our analysis of understanding a producer’s decision to 
adopt on three components. First, we consider a producer’s socioeconomic and farm 
characteristics, such as: age, education, years of experience and farm size, among others 
influence on his/her decision to adopt improved varieties and drip irrigation (Adesina & 
Chianu, 2002; Green et al., 1996; Katengeza et al., 2012; Maertens & Barrett, 2012). Second, 
we look at a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences that stem from direct elicitation with 
incentivized field experiments (Ihli & Musshoff, 2013; Liu, 2012; Love et al., 2014). And 
third, we investigate spatial patterns, as previous studies show agricultural decisions depicts 
spatial patterns within a territory. These spatial patterns reveal whether a producer’s decision 
to adopt and his/her characteristics influence neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt 
(Bichler et al., 2005; Roe et al., 2002; Wollni & Andersson, 2014). 
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3.2.2 The role of a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences on technology 
adoption 
In this research we analyze a producer’s uncertainty aversion as composed of a producer’s 
risk and ambiguity aversion (Klibanoff et al., 2005). Risk aversion arises when in uncertain 
scenarios a producer knows information about the outcomes and the probability distribution 
associated with these outcomes (Liu, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2010). As a counterpart, ambiguity 
aversion occurs when in uncertain scenarios a producer does not have enough information 
regarding the outcomes and the probability distribution associated with these outcomes (Ward 
& Singh, 2015; Warnick et al., 2011). In both cases, literature suggests that a producer who is 
risk and ambiguity averse would not be willing to move from his/her status quo, because 
his/her aversion forces him/her to avoid all additional uncertainty in the production system 
(Barham et al., 2014; Klibanoff et al., 2005).  
Many researchers report mixed evidence about the role of a producer’s risk preferences on 
technology adoption decisions. For instance, Ward & Singh (2015) show that risk and loss 
aversion increases a producer’s adoption likelihood of improved varieties on rice producers in 
rural India. Ray et al. (2016) report that loss averse producers and producers who tend to 
over-weigh unlikely events are more likely to adopt climate smart technologies. Also, 
Bezabih & Sarr (2012) show that risk aversion increases producers’ probability of crop 
diversification in Ethiopia. However, Liu (2012) shows that Chinese cotton producers who 
are strongly risk and loss averse are less likely to adopt these improved cotton varieties, but 
individuals that over-weigh unlikely events are more likely to adopt improved varieties. 
Finally, Takahashi (2013) finds that risk aversion reduces producers’ adoption probability of 
rice intensification systems in Indonesia. 
In addition, there is also mixed evidence regarding a producer’s ambiguity preference’s role 
on technology adoption. For instance, Alpizar et al. (2011) report that a producer’s ambiguity 
aversion increases the likelihood of coffee a producer to adopt strategies to adapt to climate 
change in Costa Rica. Moreover, Ross et al. (2010) and Warnick et al. (2011) report that 
ambiguity aversion is negatively associated with the probability of adoption of new 
technologies and portfolio diversification in Lao PDR and Peru, correspondingly. However, 
Ward & Singh (2015) and Takahashi (2013) find no evidence that ambiguity preference 
influences the adoption of improved rice seeds and rice intensification system in India and 
Indonesia, respectively. Given these mixed findings, we contribute with empirical evidence 
on the role of a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences play on a producer’s agricultural 
technology adoption decisions in a developing country context. 
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3.2.3 The role of spatial patterns on a producer’s technology adoption 
There is an increasing number of studies that consider the influence of spatial patterns on 
agricultural decision-making processes. Most of these studies, focus on technology adoption 
decisions, and reveal that a producer’s attitude towards a technology could influence 
neighboring producers’ farm-related decisions (Bichler et al., 2005; Holloway et al., 2002; 
Läpple & Kelley, 2014; Lewis et al., 2011; Roe et al., 2002; Schmidtner et al., 2011; Wollni 
& Andersson, 2014). In this research we follow Läpple & Kelley (2014) and Wollni & 
Andersson (2014) and consider that spatial patterns are made up of two components: spatial 
dependence among producers and spatial spill-over effects. 
Regarding spatial dependence among producers refers to whether a producer’s decision to 
adopt a technology influences his/her neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt the same 
technology (Läpple & Kelley, 2014). In the current literature, we find some possible 
explanations for this spatial dependence effect to be present within a specific territory. For 
instance, social norms and cultural factors, local natural, ecological and agricultural 
conditions, social learning and informal sharing between producers, and regional and local 
agglomeration effects. First, as according to di Falco & Bulte (2011) the attitude of a producer 
towards a technology is a potential driver to incentivize neighboring producers’ adoption. 
Furthermore, in rural areas of developing countries a strong social influence exists for 
producers to behave in a similar way as their peers. Consequently, this social influence could 
assist or constraint a producer’s technology adoption in some communities or villages 
(Maertens & Barrett, 2012). 
Second, local natural, ecological and agricultural conditions can create positive economic 
environments, which could influence technology adoption. For instance, soil quality, rainfall, 
temperature and microclimate are factors that could affect technological performance in 
certain areas. Hence, these conditions could influence a producer’s decision to adopt 
technologies in specific areas (Bichler et al., 2005; Läpple & Kelley, 2014). 
Third, it is common that high quality technical information is only accessible in specific 
areas, which usually coincide with villages and/or communes where agricultural agents assist 
producers (Wollni & Andersson, 2014). This is noticeably relevant in developing countries, 
where producers usually do not have sufficient access to technical information (Läpple & 
Kelley, 2014). Consequently, interaction between producers in and outside of these areas 
could increase social learning and reduce the cost of access to technical information, 
influencing a producer’s technology adoption (Bhargava et al., 2015). Finally, some villages 
or communes have agglomeration effects that could assist or constraint a producer’s decision-
making process in specific locations. These regional and local agglomeration effects could 
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include: production input costs, harvest transportation costs, presence of local markets, access 
to qualified labor, and technological spatial spill-overs (Bhargava et al., 2015; Eades & 
Brown, 2006; Lakner et al., 2011; Schmidtner et al., 2011; Wollni & Andersson, 2014). 
Regarding spatial spill-over effects, these effects capture whether a change in a producer’s 
characteristics influence neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt. Also, similar to Läpple & 
Kelley (2014) and Wollni & Andersson (2014), we account these effects by combining a 
producer’s characteristics and a spatial weight matrix into our model.  
The majority of the studies in the current literature that analyze the role of spatial patterns on 
a producer’s decision to adopt report significant effects for spatial dependence among 
producers. However, most of these studies are conducted in developed countries. Even though 
we do not expect this spatial dependence to be different in developing countries, we do expect 
that the spatial spill-over effects to differ in these countries. Since small-scale producers have 
different characteristics and face harder constraints to adapt to production uncertainty, 
compared to producers in developed countries, it is also likely that the spatial spill-over 
effects are different (Feder, et al., 1985; Handschuch et al., 2013).  
As a result, we contribute with empirical evidence regarding the role spatial patterns play on a 
producer’s technology adoption decisions in developing countries. Furthermore, we are not 
aware of previous studies that combine elicited producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, 
which are elicited through field experiments, and spatial dependence in order to analyze a 
producer’s decision to adopt technology. 
3.3 Data source and description of variables 
In this study we use the same data as Cárcamo & von Cramon-Taubadel (2016). In their 
study, they conducted field experiments to elicit producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, 
and a survey to collect producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics. This elicitation 
and collection process was conducted with 102 small-scale raspberry producers in rural 
communes of Maule region, Chile (Figure 2-1). Nevertheless, nine producers made errors 
during field experiments, and it was not possible to estimate their risk and ambiguity 
preferences; therefore, we exclude these producers from the analysis. 
Regarding producers’ decision to adopt, we notice that one third of the sampled producers 
have adopted drip irrigation or improved raspberry varieties within the past five years (Table 
3-1). Also, during their field work, Cárcamo & von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) asked producers 
whether they had adopted improved varieties, what variety they adopted, and the reason for 
adopting them. In this regard, more than seventy percent of adopter producers confirmed that 
they adopted Heritage as an improved variety, while the rest of adopter producers adopted 
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Chilliwack, Meeker, Regina and Amity. Regardless, more than ninety percent of the adopter 
producers claimed to have adopted improved varieties to increase their current production. 
Table 3-1. Descriptive statistics for the sample 
Variable Mean Standard error 
Adoption variables   
Producers who adopted improved raspberry varieties 0.34 0.05 
Producers who adopted drip irrigation 0.31 0.05 
Producer’s characteristics   
Household and farm characteristics   
Age 51.26 51.26 
Household size 3.46 0.12 
Education 8.14 0.34 
Off-farm income 0.33 0.05 
Access to saving accounts 0.48 0.05 
Access to agricultural loans 0.54 0.05 
Household expenditure 234∙129 11∙276 
Raspberry area 0.52 0.06 
Farm size 4.04 0.70 
Raspberry experience 10.48 0.67 
Members of farmers’ association 0.19 0.04 
Risk and ambiguity preferences   
Producers’ curvature of the prospect value function 0.66 0.04 
Producers’ loss aversion 3.54 0.28 
Producers’ probability weighing 0.85 0.03 
Producers’ ambiguity preference 1.50 0.24 
Total observations 93   
Authors’ own estimations based on Cárcamo & von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) 
Regarding producers’ household and farm characteristics, producers are on average older than 
51 years old, their household is composed of three to four members, and have more than eight 
years of education. In addition, one third of sampled producers have an off-farm income, 
roughly half of them have access to saving accounts and to agricultural loans, and their 
monthly household expenditure is around 234∙000 Chilean pesos8. In addition, on average 
these producers yield raspberries on roughly half of a hectare, and their total farm size is 
approximately four hectares. Also, these producers have more than ten years’ experience 
working with the raspberry crop.  
Regarding a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences, Cárcamo & von Cramon-Taubadel 
(2016) estimate four parameters to identify these preferences: producer’s curvature of the 
prospect value function, loss aversion, probability weighing, and ambiguity preference. The 
interplay of these four parameters reveal a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences, in 
Figure A-1 we depict the distribution of these parameters. The first two parameters capture 
producers’ risk aversion in gains and losses domains, correspondingly (Liu, 2012; Ward & 
Singh, 2015). Producers’ probability weighing measures whether producers distort 
probabilities associated to events. And ambiguity preference measures whether producers’ 
                                                          
8 When the field work was conducted the exchange rate was 698 Chilean pesos per Euro 
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decisions vary when there is incomplete information in their decision-making scenarios 
(Ward & Singh, 2015). 
Table 3-2. Description of variables 
Variable Description Hypothesized sign 
Dependent variables   
Producers who adopted improved 
raspberry varieties 
Producers adopted improved raspberry varieties 
= 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Producers who adopted drip irrigation 
Producers adopted drip irrigation = 1, 0 
otherwise 
 
Independent variables   
Household and farm characteristics   
Education Producer’s schooling level, measured in years + 
Farm size Total utilizable area in the farm, measured in 
hectares 
± 
Raspberry experience Producers experience working with raspberry 
measured in years 
+ 
Members of farmers’ association Producer is member of a farmers’ association = 
1. 0 otherwise 
+ 
Risk and ambiguity preferences   
Producers’ risk aversion in gains 
domains 
Ranges from 0 to 1. Higher value = less risk 
aversion 
- 
Producers’ risk aversion in losses 
domains 
Higher value = more loss aversion - 
Producers’ probability weighing Ranges from 0 to 1.5. Higher value = producers 
assign less probability to unlikely events 
+ 
Producers’ ambiguity preference Higher value = more ambiguity aversion - 
Authors’ own estimations based on Cárcamo & von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) 
In Table 3-2, we describe the variables we use in our models and our expectations from these 
variables based on the current literature. Regarding our dependent variables, in the field 
Cárcamo & von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) observed whether producers adopted drip irrigation 
and/or improved raspberry varieties, and capture this information with two dummy variables. 
These variables take the value of 1 if a producer adopted drip irrigation or improved raspberry 
varieties, and 0 otherwise. 
According to the independent variables we use in our model, we expect that a producer’s 
years of education will have a positive effect on their decision to adopt technology (Cavatassi 
et al., 2011; Maertens & Barrett, 2012). As Wollni & Andersson (2014) state, there is mixed 
evidence about the role of farm size on technology adoption; therefore, we expect this 
variable to be positive or negative depending on the technology adopted. Also we expect that 
a producer’s experience will play a positive role on their decision to adopt technology 
(Alpizar et al., 2011; Edirisinghe et al., 2013). And finally, we expect that producers who are 
members of a farmers’ association are also more likely to adopt (Nkegbe & Shankar, 2014; 
Uaiene et al., 2009). 
Regarding a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences, we expect that producers who are 
averse to risk in gains and loss domains, and to ambiguity scenarios would be reluctant to 
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adopt technologies (Ihli & Musshoff, 2013; Warnick et al., 2011). However, as Liu (2012) 
shows, the producers who over-weigh unlikely events are more likely to adopt; thus we also 
expect that producers who show the same behavior would be more willing to adopt 
technology. 
3.4 Empirical framework 
As outlined above, we hypothesize that producers’ technology adoption is influenced by three 
components: a producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics, his/her risk and ambiguity 
preferences, and spatial patterns. As a result, we need a limited dependent variable model that 
allows us to include these components into a model. Consequently, we analyze a producer’s 
decision to adopt by using a Spatial Durbin probit model (SPDM) which takes the following 
general form: 
y = ρWy + X1β + X2β + ε (3.1) 
where 𝑦 reflects our dependent variable, in our case a producer’s decision to adopt drip 
irrigation or improved varieties. 𝑊 represents the spatial weight matrix, which reflects the 
relation of producers’ locations and the Euclidean distance between them; hence, 𝑊𝑦 
represents our dependent spatial lag variable. 𝑋1 represents the matrix containing the 
producers’ socioeconomic and farm characteristics, and 𝑋2 represent producer’s risk and 
ambiguity preferences. In addition, 𝜌 and 𝛽 are unknown coefficients to be estimated, and  is 
the normally distributed error term with a mean of zero and a variance of 𝜎2 (Lacombe & 
LeSage, 2015; LeSage & Pace, 2010; LeSage, 2014; Roe et al., 2002). 
To create our 𝑊 we consider the influence of two factors: the distance between producers and 
the number of producers in given neighborhoods (Läpple & Kelley, 2014; LeSage, 2014). To 
capture these factors in our 𝑊, we first apply an inverse transformation to the distance 
between producers; thus, a producer’s decision exerts more influence on closer producers 
(Läpple & Kelley, 2014). Second, we create 𝑊 to be row-standardized, therefore regardless 
of the number of producers in a neighborhood, every row in 𝑊 sums up to one. Hence, a 
producer’s spatial effects’ influence on an individual neighboring producer’s decision to 
adopt decrease as the number of producers in the given neighborhood increases (Holloway et 
al., 2002). 
In addition, to create our 𝑊 we also follow Roe et al. (2002), Lapple & Kelley (2014) and 
Wollni & Andersson (2014) and specify maximum distance thresholds (𝐷). We assume that 
beyond these thresholds there is no spatial dependence among producers. In other words, if 
the distance (𝑑) between producer 𝑖 and their neighboring producers 𝑗 (𝑑𝑖𝑗) is larger than 𝐷, 
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then the spatial weights (𝑤𝑖𝑗) are zero. Contrary, if 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is smaller than 𝐷, then 𝑤𝑖𝑗 take values 
of the inverse distance between producers and their neighboring producers (𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1). 
To define 𝐷, we select a distance of 10.9 km which is the minimum distance for every 
producer to have at least one neighbor9. Also, by selecting this threshold we achieve the 
largest t-value test for our spatial dependence term. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we 
also test our model with three additional threshold distances10: 15, 20 and 30 km. These 
distance thresholds are similar to others in current literature, for instance: Roe et al. (2002) 
also compared their model at different thresholds that range from 50 to 300 miles, and Lapple 
& Kelley (2014) consider thresholds from 20 to 50 kilometers. 
One of the advantages of using SPDM is that it allows us to estimate three types of marginal 
effects: direct, total and indirect effects. The direct effects capture how a change in a 
producer’s explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖 affect his/her adoption decision 𝑦𝑖. Total effects capture 
how a change in 𝑥𝑖 influences the adoption likelihood of all producers (producers and 
neighboring producers). Indirect effects (or spatial spill–over effects) measure how a change 
in a producer’s explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖 influence neighboring producers’ adoption decisions, 
and it is calculated by subtracting direct effects from total effects (LeSage, 2014; LeSage & 
Pace, 2010). These spatial spill-over effects are cumulative; consequently, these effects 
measure a producer’s influence on all neighboring producers. Also, these spatial spill-over 
effects are stronger for closer producers and for producers with few neighboring producers 
(Lacombe & LeSage, 2015; Läpple & Kelley, 2014; Wollni & Andersson, 2014). 
However, there is an ongoing discussion in the literature that states that the frequentist 
approach of the SPDM has some issues dealing with latent dependent variables; consequently, 
some researchers such as Edirisinghe et al. (2013) and Lacombe & LeSage (2015) favor a 
Bayesian SPDM. The latter is preferred mostly because it assumes that model coefficients 
have distributions instead of point estimates. Even though we are not using a latent dependent 
variable in our model, to be consistent with current literature we use the Bayesian approach 
for the SPDM (Läpple & Kelley, 2014; Wollni & Andersson, 2014). Also, this model has the 
advantage of converging towards a non-spatial probit model if 𝜌 = 0 (LeSage & Pace, 2010; 
Loomis & Mueller, 2013). 
3.5 Results 
To justify the usage of a spatial method in our study, we compare the results of a non-spatial 
probit model with those of a SPDM. As we notice from Table 3-3, both models deliver the 
                                                          
9 On average using a 10.9 km radius every producer has 18 neighbors 
10 The results from these models are similar (available from the authors) 
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same significant variables, with exception of a producer’s experience which is barely 
insignificant with the SPDM. 
Table 3-3. Regression estimates of producers’ drip irrigation adoption on a set of producers’ characteristics, 






Estimate t value Pr(>|z|) 
 
Estimate z value Pr(>|z|) 
 Intercept 0.260 0.534 0.593 
 
0.114 0.147 0.883 
 Producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics       
Years of education 0.014 1.096 0.273 
 
0.067 1.401 0.161 
 Total farm size -0.020 -2.668 0.008 *** -0.079 -2.284 0.022 ** 
Producer's experience 0.011 1.586 0.113 
 
0.048 1.923 0.055 * 
Member of farmers' association 0.343 2.712 0.007 *** 1.171 2.849 0.004 *** 
Producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences       
Risk preference (gains domain) 0.004 0.033 0.974 
 
0.027 0.060 0.952 
 Risk preference (losses domain) -0.030 -1.814 0.070 * -0.122 -1.868 0.062 * 
Probability weighing -0.358 -2.499 0.012 ** -1.425 -2.405 0.016 ** 
Ambiguity preference -0.023 -1.267 0.205 
 
-0.067 -0.979 0.323 
 Significance codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Even though both models deliver similar results, we prefer the SPDM, because of its property 
to let us identify whether spatial patterns influence neighboring producers’ technology 
adoption decisions. 
3.5.1 The role of spatial dependence on producers’ drip irrigation adoption 
We find our spatial dependence coefficient to be −0.366 for our selected model (10.9 km) 
(Table 3-4). Regarding the magnitude of this coefficient, it is similar to other studies in 
developing countries: Wollni & Andersson (2014) (𝜌 = 0.321), Edirisinghe, et al. (2013) 
(𝜌 = 0.447) and Holloway et al. (2002) (𝜌 = 0.540). However, our findings report a 
negative sign for this coefficient, which contradicts previous literature. This negative sign 
implies that, on average a producer’s decision to adopt drip irrigation, negatively influences 
neighboring producers’ decision to adopt the same technology. 
 Table 3-4. Spatial dependence estimates for producers’ adoption of drip irrigation model at different distance 
thresholds 
Distance threshold (km) t-value test Spatial dependence coefficient 95 percent credible 
interval 
10.9 4.45 (𝑝 = 0.003) -0.366  -0.654 – -0.079 
15.0 4.29 (𝑝 = 0.004) -0.398  -0.713 – -0.082 
20.0 4.56 (𝑝 = 0.003) -0.444  -0.771 – -0.117 
30.0 4.12 (𝑝 = 0.004) -0.456  -0.812 – -0.100 
 
We could not find previous studies that report a negative coefficient for this spatial 
dependence coefficient; however, we have two possible explanations for this negative effect. 
First as Bhargava et al. (2015) argue, there is a learning process between a producer and 
his/her neighboring producers, which plays a significant role on influencing neighboring 
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producers’ technology adoption decisions. Usually, this learning process is beneficial for 
neighboring producers’ technology adoption, since they learn from the adopter producer’s 
experience, avoid mistakes and take shortcuts, making adoption easier. However, we believe 
that this learning process could be a double-edged sword, since neighboring producers could 
also learn from an adopter producer’s negative attitudes and experiences, constraining 
neighboring producers’ adoption. These negative attitudes and experiences can arise from 
many sources, such as: lack of technical assistance and follow-up after adoption, incremental 
operational costs, and high initial investment, among others. In addition, this learning process 
in combination with the technical complexity of drip irrigation, and a producer’s risk and 
ambiguity preferences, could decrease a producer’s expected benefits from adopting drip 
irrigation, resulting in a combination of factors that could constraint neighboring producers’ 
technology adoption (Friedlander et al., 2013).  
Second according to Green et al. (1996) and Pokhrel et al. (2016), for producers with farms 
on good soil conditions, adopting water saving irrigation technologies, such as drip irrigation, 
are not always profitable. In Maule, raspberry producers are located on central valley alluvial 
soils, that are characterized for being deep, well-structured and with high contents of organic 
matter (Sistema Integrado de Información Territorial (SIIT), 2014; Universidad de Chile, 
2013). In addition, Figure A-2 shows that raspberry producers are located on soils with less 
than three percent of slope. Furthermore, we find that all producers in our sample have 
manual or flood irrigation systems on their farms. Hence, since raspberry production is 
located on good and flat soils, and producers have at least one irrigation system, then it is 
likely that drip irrigation results in any increment in a producer’s profit. However, even if at 
the moment this technology does not improve adopter producers’ profit, considering the 
future rain scenarios described by Minetti et al. (2003), Universidad de Chile (2006) and 
Gobierno de Chile (2013), in the future producers’ motivation to adopt drip irrigation should 
not increase their profits, but enable them to produce on their current farm location. 
Even though we do not have data to prove any of these possible explanations, we conducted 
some efforts to identify if our estimate for spatial dependence coefficient reflects the current 
situation of the Chilean raspberry sector. Consequently, we discussed this finding with some 
Chilean berries experts, who stated that it is common to see producers who abandon drip 
irrigation to go back to flood irrigation. Therefore, even if we do not find previous reports for 
a negative spatial dependence coefficient in the current literature, our finding captures a 
disadoption effect for the drip irrigation in the Chilean raspberry sector. 
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3.5.2 The role of a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences, and 
socioeconomic and farm characteristics on drip irrigation adoption 
In addition to spatial dependence influences on a producer’s decision to adopt, we note four 
variables that significantly explain producers’ drip irrigation adoption (Table 3-5). In 
addition, we find one variable that has a significant spatial spill-over effect. This spatial spill-
over effect is larger in magnitude than its direct effect, however this spatial spill-over is 
cumulative over all neighboring producers (Läpple & Kelley, 2014; Wollni & Andersson, 
2014). 
Table 3-5. Marginal effects for SPDM regression of producers’ adoption of drip irrigation on their socioeconomic, 





















Lower Upper  Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Producers’ household and farm characteristics         
Years of 
education 
0.015 -0.005 0.038 
 
-0.016 -0.053 0.021 
 
-0.001 -0.045 0.041 
Total farm size -0.020*** -0.035 -0.008 
 
0.000 -0.020 0.018 
 
-0.020* -0.040 0.001 
Producers' 
experience 
0.009 -0.003 0.022 
 
0.023** 0.008 0.042 
 




0.353*** 0.130 0.578 
 
-0.118 -0.426 0.171 
 
0.236 -0.071 0.483 




-0.028 -0.224 0.197 
 
0.348 -0.041 0.722 
 
0.320 -0.097 0.760 
Loss aversion -0.031* -0.062 -0.005 
 
0.013 -0.046 0.074 
 
-0.019 -0.080 0.057 
Probability 
weighing 
-0.358** -0.602 -0.111 
 
0.005 -0.453 0.450 
 
-0.353 -0.829 0.162 
Ambiguity 
preference 
-0.024 -0.055 0.006 
 
0.009 -0.049 0.073 
 
-0.015 -0.084 0.059 
Significance codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In terms of a producer’s household and farm characteristics, we find that farm size has a 
negative effect on adopting drip irrigation technology. Our results show that for every 
additional hectare available for producers to cultivate, the likelihood of adoption decreases by 
two percent. Similar results for farm size in developing countries are reported by Wossen et 
al. (2015), Uaiene et al. (2009) and Holloway et al. (2002). 
We find that the direct effect for a producer’s experience is not significant at the ten percent 
level, however we find significant indirect and total effects for this variable. Our results 
suggest that one additional year of experience of a producer, increases neighboring producers’ 
adoption likelihood by a cumulative 2.3 percent. In total this variable increases adoption 
likelihood of all producers by 3.3 percent. Positive effects for a producer’s experience on 
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technology adoption are widely documented in the literature; Roco et al. (2014), Gbetibouo 
(2009) and Adesina & Chianu (2002) report similar findings. 
Also, our results show that producers who are members of a farmers’ association are more 
likely to adopt drip irrigation by 35 percent. Previous studies such as Nkegbe & Shankar 
(2014) and Wollni & Andersson (2014) highlight positive effects for the role of a farmers’ 
association on a producer’s technology adoption. 
According to related studies, producers who are averse to risk and ambiguity scenarios would 
be reluctant to adopt agricultural technologies (Ihli & Musshoff, 2013; Tanaka et al., 2010; 
Warnick et al., 2011). Our results support this statement; we find that producers who are loss 
averse are less likely to adopt drip irrigation. Previous studies, such as Liu (2012) and Love et 
al. (2014) report similar effects for technology adoption in China and Kenya, 
correspondingly. 
We also find that producers who tend to over-weigh unlikely events are more likely to adopt 
drip irrigation. Our results are similar to those of Liu (2012), Love et al. (2014) and Ray et al. 
(2016), who report similar effects for this variable on producers’ technology adoption in 
China, Kenia and India, respectively. 
3.5.3 The role of spatial dependence on a producer’s adoption of improved 
varieties 
Similar to our results for a producers’ drip irrigation adoption, we find that the spatial 
dependence coefficient for improved varieties is also significant in all our scenarios at the 95 
percent level (Table 3-6). Contrary to our finding for drip irrigation adoption mentioned 
above, we find that for our selected threshold distance our spatial dependence coefficient is 
equal to 0.378. This finding suggests that a producer’s decision to adopt improved raspberry 
varieties positively influences the adoption on neighboring producers for the same 
technology. This result is similar in both magnitude and effect to previous reports in 
developing countries, such as Wollni & Andersson (2014), Edirisinghe, et al. (2013) and 
Holloway et al. (2002). 
Table 3-6. Spatial dependence estimates for producers’ adoption of improved varieties model at different distance 
thresholds 
Distance threshold (km) t-value test Spatial dependence coefficient 95 percent credible 
interval 
10.9 2.29 (𝑝 = 0.024) 0.378 0.056 – 0.684 
15.0 2.16 (𝑝 = 0.034) 0.383  0.034 – 0.722 
20.0 2.18 (𝑝 = 0.032) 0.410  0.051 – 0.760 
30.0 2.09 (𝑝 = 0.039) 0.421  0.046 – 0.828 
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3.5.4 The role of a producer’s risk and ambiguity preferences, and 
socioeconomic and farm characteristics on adoption of improved 
raspberry varieties 
In addition to the influence of the spatial dependence on producers’ adoption of improved 
varieties, we find four variables that explain producers’ adoption of improved varieties. Also, 
two of these variables show spatial spill-over effects on neighboring producers (Table 3-7). 
In terms of socioeconomic and farm characteristics, we notice that a producer’s education 
plays a positive role in producers’ decisions to adopt. Therefore, one additional year of 
education by a producer increases his/her direct probability of adoption by 2.7 percent, and 
also increases adoption likelihood of neighboring producers by a cumulative 1.8 percent. In 
total, one additional year of education increase adoption likelihood of improved varieties by 
4.5 percent over all producers. This result is in accordance to previous related studies, such as 
Paxton et al. (2010), Wossen et al. (2015) and Takahashi (2013) who report similar effects for 
a producer’s education influence on technology adoption in developing countries. 
Table 3-7. Marginal effects for SPDM regression of producers’ adoption of improved varieties model on their 
socioeconomic, farm and preferences characteristics 
Variable 




interval  Estimate 
90 percent 
credible 









Producers’ socioeconomic and farm 
characteristics         
Years of 
education 
0.027* 0.005 0.050 
 
0.018* 0.000 0.044 
 
0.045* 0.008 0.089 
Farm size 0.012* 0.002 0.021 
 
0.007 0.000 0.018 
 
0.019* 0.003 0.036 




0.237* 0.031 0.444 
 
0.148* 0.003 0.399 
 





0.006 -0.022 0.036 
 
0.005 -0.014 0.029 
 
0.011 -0.034 0.064 
Probability 
weighing 
-0.110 -0.356 0.136 
 
-0.066 -0.275 0.094 
 
-0.176 -0.610 0.222 
Ambiguity 
preference 
-0.153* -0.296 -0.003 
 
-0.099 -0.264 0.001 
 
-0.252* -0.531 -0.005 
Significance codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In addition, we identify that one additional hectare of farm increases a producer’s adoption 
likelihood by 1.2 percent. Also, this variable has a total effect, which increases a producer’s 
adoption likelihood 1.9 percent over all producers. In previous literature, many studies report 
a significant role of farm size on technology adoption, such as: Kassie et al. (2009), Wossen 
et al. (2015) and Kallas et al. (2010). 
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In addition, our results for producers’ risk preferences confirm that producers who are risk 
averse are reluctant to deviate from status quo and adopt improved varieties (Liu, 2012; Love 
et al., 2014; Yesuf & Köhlin, 2009). In addition, this variable has a spatial spill-over effect, 
which reflects that producers who are risk averse decrease adoption likelihood of neighboring 
producers. 
In addition, we find that ambiguity aversion has a negative direct effect on adoption 
probability. Producers who are ambiguity averse are less likely to adopt improved raspberry 
varieties. Furthermore, we also find that a producer’s ambiguity aversion correlates negatively 
with adoption likelihood over all producers. This result is in accordance with previous studies 
that report that a producers’ ambiguity aversion constraints neighboring producers’ adoption 
of improved technologies (Ross et al., 2010; Ward & Singh, 2015; Warnick et al., 2011). 
However, despite ambiguity preference’s spatial spill-over effect it is not significant; it just 
barely over the significance level and its total effects are significant. Therefore, our results 
could be pointing to a weak influence of a producer’s ambiguity aversion’s spatial spill-over 
effect on neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt.  
3.6 Conclusions 
As we outlined above, we hypothesize that a producer’s decision to adopt is influenced by 
three aspects: his/her socioeconomic characteristics, risk and ambiguity preferences and 
spatial patterns among producers. Hence, we use a SPDM to consider the roles of these 
aspects on a producer’s decision to adopt drip irrigation and improved raspberry varieties. As 
expected, a producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics are in accordance with related 
literature. A producer’s characteristics, such as: years of education, experience working with 
raspberry, farm size, and being a member of a farmers’ association influence a producer’s 
decisions to adopt drip irrigation and/or improved raspberry varieties. 
In addition, our findings support previous literature that state that a producer’s risk and 
ambiguity preferences constrain a producer’s decision to adopt technology. Our results 
confirm that with exception of a producer’s weighing probability, the remaining risk and 
ambiguity preference’s parameters constrain a producer’s decision to adopt drip irrigation and 
improved raspberry varieties. 
Regarding the role of spatial patterns on producers’ adoption of drip irrigation and improved 
raspberry varieties, we expect that a producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics have 
spatial spill-over effects. In this context, we find that a producer’s characteristics such as: a 
producer’s experience working with raspberry, and years of education generate positive 
spatial spill-over effects that influence neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt. In addition, 
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we find that a producer’s risk preference in gains domains have spatial spill-over effects that 
influence neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt. Similar to the direct effect of a 
producer’s risk preference in gains domains, this spatial spill-over effect reflects that 
producers who are risk averse constrain the technology adoption likelihood of neighboring 
producers. 
Furthermore, we identify an influence of spatial dependence among producers on neighboring 
producers’ decisions to adopt. This finding reveals that a producer’s decision to adopt drip 
irrigation or improved varieties influences neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt. 
Regarding a producer’s decision to adopt improved varieties, as we expected, the coefficient 
for this spatial dependence reveals that a producer’s adoption of improved raspberry varieties 
increases the adoption likelihood of neighboring producers. However, regarding drip 
irrigation adoption, contrary to our expectations, we find a negative coefficient for spatial 
dependence among producers. This negative coefficient represents that a producer’s decision 
to adopt drip irrigation negatively influences neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt. Even 
though we do not find previous evidence in current literature that supports this finding, we 
discussed this finding with some Chilean soft-fruits experts, who stated that despite not 
having the data to prove any possible explanations for this coefficient, it captures what is 
happening with drip irrigation among raspberry small-scale producers in rural Maule. 
We have three possible limitations for our study, these limitations at the same time should 
motivate further studies in this field. First, regarding the construction of the spatial weight 
matrix; to create this matrix we consider two characteristics: distance between producers and 
the number of producers in the neighborhood. However, there are other characteristics that 
could influence this spatial matrix that we do not consider in our analysis. For instance: a 
producer’s leadership within the villages, a producer’s experience, early adopters and if 
family members who also produce raspberry have adopted drip irrigation or improved 
raspberry varieties. 
Second, in the current literature there are many possible explanations about the presence of 
spatial patterns in a specific area: climate and soil characteristics, local markets, and 
competitive advantages, among others. However, even though we identify the influence of 
spatial patterns on small-scale producers’ decisions to adopt, we are not able to identify what 
local characteristics generate these spatial patterns in the Maule region. 
And third, due to our data constraints, we could not explore in detail our negative coefficient 
for spatial dependence among producers. Therefore, future studies that capture a producer’s 
attitude towards drip irrigation, government subsidies, and a producer’s financial constraints, 
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among others could help to provide further details and policy implications for a producer’s 
technology adoption in rural Maule. 
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Figure A-1. Distribution of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences 
Authors’ own calculations based on Cárcamo & von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Sistema Integrado de Información Territorial (SIIT) (2014) 
Figure A-2. Producers’ location and slope categories 




4 Concluding remarks 
In this dissertation we study two aspects that help Chilean small-scale raspberry producers 
cope with production uncertainty: characterize producers’ behavior in decision-making 
process under uncertainty, and analyze producer’s decision to adopt technologies (Liu, 2012; 
Ward & Singh, 2015). To characterize producers’ behavior under uncertainty we first use 
incentivized field experiments to elicit the risk and ambiguity preferences of small-scale 
producers. We complement these experiments with a questionnaire which provides 
information on producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics that could influence these 
preferences. In the second paper, we study how producer characteristics, preferences, and 
spatial patterns influence decisions to adopt technology. 
In the following two sections, we summarize both studies that compose the main chapters of 
this dissertation and describe our research questions, methods, key findings, limitations and 
suggestions of research prospects for future studies. Furthermore, since both chapters aim to 
help producers cope with production uncertainty, then we find a link between both chapters. 
Therefore, our third section summarizes key findings and limitations from both chapters 
jointly. 
4.1 Assessing small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences: evidence from field-experiment data in rural Chile 
In this study, we have three research questions, which lead us to identify producers’ risk and 
ambiguity preferences. First, do producers’ risk preferences differ regarding the method we 
use to estimate these preferences from Tanaka’s et al. (2010) field experiment design? 
Second, what is producers’ preference towards risk and ambiguity scenarios? And third, what 
socioeconomic and farm characteristics influence a producer’s risk and ambiguity 
preferences? 
To answer our research questions, we use incentivized field experiments on a sample of 102 
Chilean small-scale raspberry producers in rural Maule. During these experiments, producers 
face a series of binary choices, composed of a certain lottery with a certain outcome, and a 
risk/ambiguous lottery which have two possible outcomes, winning and losing. These 
winning and losing outcomes involve a larger and a smaller payment compared to the certain 
lottery, correspondingly. In addition, to capture true producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences in these experiments we use a monetary incentive. To pay this incentive we select 
randomly one round from the experiments and play it for real, the amount of money that 
producers receive would depend at the decision they take during the experiments. Hence, at 
the beginning of the experimental session we explain to producers how this incentive works, 




and encourage them to take every decision as serious as possible. Finally, we complement our 
experiments with a questionnaire that allow us to collect producer’s socioeconomic, 
demographic and farm characteristics. The results from this questionnaire allow us to explore 
and identify producer’s characteristics that influence their risk and ambiguity preferences. 
With regards to our first research question, we use two methods that are standard to estimate 
producers’ risk preferences from field experiments: the midpoint method and the structural 
method. We find that our results of producers’ risk preferences from both methods are 
similar, but with three important differences. First, our results with the structural method 
suggest that producers correlate with a strong risk aversion, however our results with the 
midpoint method points that producer correlate with a moderate risk aversion. Second, the 
asymmetry between producers’ risk preferences in the gain and losses domains increases with 
the midpoint method. And third, we find that with the structural method producers’ 
probability weighing parameter hints that producers do not distort probabilities of events. 
However, with the midpoint method, we find that producers distort these probabilities by 
over-weighing unlikely events. As a consequence, the method we use to estimate producers’ 
risk preferences could lead to analyze different estimates. 
About producers’ preference in ambiguity scenarios, we find that producers preferred to 
choose the certain lottery and earn a smaller outcome, than selecting the ambiguity lottery and 
the opportunity to earn a larger outcome. This result reflects that there is ambiguity aversion 
among producers, and implies that it is likely for producers to avoid decision-making 
scenarios where ambiguity is present. 
In relation to our third research question, we find that producer’s age, farm size, household 
expenditure, farmers’ association membership and whether producers have agricultural loans 
associate with producers’ risk preferences. Furthermore, we find that producer’s gender, 
household size, household expenditure and experience working with raspberry correlate with 
producers’ ambiguity aversion. 
Through the elicitation of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, and the analysis of 
producer’s characteristics as determinants of these preferences, we provide useful inputs to 
strengthen plans of action of current agricultural policies. However, our study has at least two 
potential limitations. The first limitation is related to producers’ behavior during experiments. 
Decision-making process is complex, and producers could have many objectives to 
accomplish; also, in real life producers could foresee and plan to face risk and ambiguity 
scenarios. Our experiments are a simplification of decision-making scenarios, and producers 
do not have time to plan and decide. As a result, it is possible that producers could behave in 




different manner during experiments, and as consequence do not capture producer’s true risk 
and ambiguity preferences (Ihli & Musshoff, 2013). 
Second, in the current literature there is a debate about the external validity of experimental 
approaches. According to some authors the use of experiments to reveal insights about 
producers’ behavior is limited, because such experiments lack of external validity, and 
therefore it is difficult to generalize results to other producers, and/or crops. Nevertheless, 
most researchers agree that the benefits from experiments’ internal validity are more relevant 
than the lack of external validity (Guala & Mittone, 2005; Schram, 2005). Thus, producers 
could be more risk averse in real life situations, which imply that our estimations 
underestimate producers’ real risk and ambiguity preferences. As a result, from these two 
limitations, our estimations could underestimate real producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences. 
There are many opportunities for future research, for instance to consider other behavior 
preferences could contribute to a better characterization of producers’ behavior, such as: time 
preferences and producer’s learning process (Barham et al., 2015; Tanaka et al., 2010). In 
addition, we do not identify whether there is influence of spatial patterns on these preferences 
(Bhargava et al., 2015). Also it is possible that producers’ behavior could be correlated with 
psychological factors such as: intelligence quotient, emotional intelligence and psychological 
inertia (Ihli & Musshoff, 2013; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Analyzing these topics 
could reveal additional contributions for a better characterization of producers’ decision-
making process under uncertainty. 
4.2 The role of spatial patterns, and producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences on small-scale agricultural technology adoption 
In our third chapter, we follow four research questions to analyze producer’s decision to adopt 
technology. First, what producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics influence 
producer’s decision to adopt technology? Second, how producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences influence producer’s decision to adopt technology? Third, does producer’s 
decision to adopt a technology influence neighboring producers to adopt the same 
technology? And fourth, do producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics, and their risk 
and ambiguity preferences generate spatial spill-over effects that influence neighboring 
producers’ decisions to adopt technology? 
To answer these research questions, we combine our dataset and results from producers’ 
preferences study, with a SPDM that allow us to analyze producer’s characteristics, and 
spatial patterns influence on producer’s decision to adopt technology. Furthermore, since in 




Chile adoption of water-saving irrigation techniques, improved varieties, and other water-
saving techniques are national strategic priority, we focus our research on producer’s adoption 
of improved raspberry varieties and drip irrigation (Gobierno de Chile, 2013; Universidad de 
Chile, 2006). These technologies could help producers to cope with production uncertainty, 
especially the one that arises from climate variability and climate change in Chilean central 
regions. 
Regarding our first research question, we find three socioeconomic and farm characteristics 
that influence a producer’s decision to adopt. According to our expectations, producers who 
are members of a farmers’ association and producer’s years of education increase producer’s 
likelihood to adopt drip irrigation and improved raspberry varieties, respectively. Also, we 
find that producer’s farm size decreases adoption likelihood of drip irrigation, but increases 
adoption likelihood of improved raspberry varieties. 
As expected, we find that risk aversion in the gains domain, and ambiguity aversion both 
decrease a producer’s likelihood of adoption improved raspberry varieties. In addition, risk 
aversion in the losses domain reduces the likelihood that a producer will adopt drip irrigation. 
However, a producer’s probability weighing preference increases the likelihood that he/she 
will adopt drip irrigation. In other words, those producers who over-weigh probabilities of 
unlikely events are more likely to adopt drip irrigation. 
Previous studies suggest that spatial dependence positively influences producers’ decisions to 
adopt technology. This statement makes sense, because producers could learn from adopter 
producer’s experience, avoid mistakes and take shortcuts, which results in an easier adoption 
process for neighboring producers. Our results show that a producer’s decision to adopt 
improved raspberry varieties has a positive effect on neighboring producers. This implies that 
if a producer decides to adopt improved varieties, then neighboring producers are more likely 
to also be willing to adopt. However, contrary to our expectations and to what previous 
studies suggest, our estimate for producer’s spatial dependence for drip irrigation reflects a 
negative effect on neighboring producers’ decisions to adopt the same technology. We 
discussed this finding with some berry production and irrigation specialists in Maule region, 
and they claim that our finding captures the dis-adoption of drip irrigation that is currently 
taking place in the industry. 
Regarding our fourth research question, we find three variables that generate spatial spill-over 
effects. In terms of producer’s socioeconomic and farm characteristics: producer’s experience 
working with raspberry, and years of education generate positive spatial spill-over effects that 
increase neighboring producers’ adoption likelihood of drip irrigation and improved varieties, 
respectively. In terms of producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, we find that risk 




preference in the gains domain has a spatial spill-over effect that decreases neighboring 
producers’ adoption likelihood of improved raspberry varieties. We are not aware of previous 
studies that combine producers’ preferences that stems from direct elicitation with spatial 
methods, therefore there are no previous evidence of producers’ risk and ambiguity 
preferences to have spatial spill-over effects. 
Our results provide empirical evidence about small-scale raspberry producer’s adoption of 
drip irrigation and improved varieties in rural Maule. Since both technologies are national 
strategic priority in the agricultural sector, then our results could help Chilean policy-makers 
to redefine and/or strengthen plans of action of current agricultural policies. However, our 
study has three potential limitations that restrict our findings.  
The first limitation is a lack of information about the local characteristics that trigger spatial 
dependence among producers. As outlined above, we find a spatial dependence effect on 
producer’s decision to adopt. If the characteristics that trigger spatial dependence change over 
time, then this change could affect producers’ decisions to adopt (Läpple & Kelley, 2014). 
Characteristics such as the presence of local markets, better access to markets, and other 
competitive advantages could change over time and influence producer’s decision to adopt. 
Therefore, investigating local characteristics that triggers spatial dependence, the way these 
characteristics change over time, and whether these changes influence spatial dependence, 
could provide policy-makers with meaningful inputs for agricultural policies (Lakner et al., 
2011; Läpple & Kelley, 2014; LeSage et al. 2011). 
The second limitation concerns the estimation of the influence of a producer’s decision and 
characteristics on his/her neighboring producers. We consider the distance between 
producers, and the number of producers in a neighborhood to determine whether and how a 
producer influences nearby producers. However, in reality there are many characteristics that 
could affect this influence: a producer’s leadership, attitude from early adopters, and family 
members who adopted technology could also influence producers decisions to adopt (Läpple 
& Kelley, 2014; Roe et al., 2002). The consideration of any additional characteristics to 
analyze the influence of a producer’s decision and characteristics on his/her neighboring 
producers, could change the interpretation and coefficients for indirect and total marginal 
effects in our study. 
Third, raspberry production in Chile is concentrated in central regions, and it is likely that 
there are cultural, social and economic similarities among producers in these regions. 
However, there are also differences in characteristics that influence technology performance 
within an area, such as climate, and soil quality. These differences make it difficult to 
generalize our results to other regions. 




The opportunities for future studies in this topic are many. Although the use of spatial 
methods to analyze producers’ technology adoption is growing, comparatively little work has 
been done in developing countries. Even though we do not expect that spatial dependence to 
differ in developing countries, we do expect some differences on producer’s spatial spill-over 
effects. As a result, analyzing producers’ decisions to adopt technology with spatial methods 
in these countries, could contribute with key elements for policy-making design. Furthermore, 
the use of spatial panel data methods could contribute to a better understanding about spatial 
dependence and spatial spill-over effects, and if these characteristics change over time. 
Finally, including group field experiments with producers in the analysis could reveal key 
aspects for technology adoption. Some examples of these experiments are: producer’s 
leadership, trust games, and coordination among producers (Alpizar et al., 2011; Colomer, 
1995; Rigdon et al., 2007). 
4.3 General concluding remarks 
We explore methods to help Chilean small-scale raspberry producers cope with production 
uncertainty. We focus on characterizing producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, and on 
analyzing producer’s decision to adopt drip irrigation and improved raspberry varieties. Both 
studies in this dissertation are based on the same dataset. Furthermore, the link between 
producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences, and producer’s decision to adopt technology has 
been widely explored in the current literature (Liu, 2012; Ward & Singh, 2015; Barham, et al. 
2015). Therefore, in this section we discuss findings and limitations to both studies jointly. 
We notice that producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences correlate negatively with producer’s 
decision to adopt technology. Therefore, agricultural policies that focus on helping producers 
to cope with risk and ambiguity would lead to an increase in technology adoption. 
Furthermore, there is a spatial spill-over effect that derives from producers’ risk preference in 
gains domain. This spatial spill-over effect suggests that helping some producers to cope with 
risk would also have effects on neighboring producers. 
However, we find one limitation that affects both of our chapters simultaneously. Even 
though we can explore small-scale raspberry producers’ risk and ambiguity preferences and 
technology adoption behavior, our sample is not representative for the Chilean raspberry 
sector. Chilean policy-makers should take this fact in consideration if they consider 
generalizing our results to producers in other regions. 
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Field work instructions 
Introducción 
Gracias por brindarme un poco de su tiempo el día de hoy, el ejercicio que realizaremos 
tomará un aproximado de una hora y media. Si usted no cuenta con el tiempo suficiente 
le ruego me lo haga saber, así podremos hacer este trabajo cuando usted tenga más 
disponibilidad. 
En esta ocasión desarrollaremos dos juegos, es importante que escuche atentamente las 
instrucciones que le daré. Si tiene alguna pregunta, por favor hágamela saber y con 
gusto le aclararé su duda. Si esta sesión se está desarrollando para dos o más 
productores simultáneamente: le suplico que cualquier duda que tengan no la hagan a 
su compañero, comuníqueme su inquietud y le daré más detalles con respecto a su 
consulta. 
En este juego usted ganará dinero por participar, sin embargo la cantidad de dinero que 
usted recibirá dependerá de las decisiones que usted tome y, en parte, de su suerte. 
En qué consiste el juego y cómo se hará el pago 
Le mostraré un total de cinco secciones del juego, que hacen un total de 57 preguntas, 
cada pregunta está debidamente numerada a lo largo del juego. Después de terminado el 
juego, le acercaré una bolsa que contiene 57 fichas numeradas desde el 1 al 57. Usted 
tomará un número de esta bolsa y el número seleccionado será comparado con la 
decisión que usted tomó en la pregunta con el mismo número y se le pagará este monto 
en efectivo. Ese dinero es suyo y puede quedarse con él. 
Luego del juego, le haré una encuesta corta relacionado a algunos aspectos sociales, 
económicos y productivos relacionados a usted y su familia, esta información nos será 
de utilidad para enriquecer los resultados del juego. 
Ronda 1 
Como lo expliqué anteriormente, en esta ronda sus ganancias dependerán de sus 
decisiones y de su suerte. Esta primera etapa consta de tres secciones, las primeras dos 
tienen 11 preguntas cada una. Haciendo, de esta forma, un total de 22 preguntas. 
Para cada pregunta en esta sección usted tiene dos posibles alternativas: la opción A que 
es la “elección segura” solo por elegir esta opción usted asegura cierta cantidad de 
dinero. Por otra parte, la opción B que es “la apuesta” en esta alternativa usted podrá 
ganar más dinero que con la “elección segura”, pero si pierde la apuesta, entonces 
recibirá menos dinero que la opción A. 
Yo le mostraré todas las preguntas de la primera sección, su punto de partida es la 
opción B y usted debe decirme en cuántas preguntas desea seleccionar la opción B y 
en cuántas la opción A. A continuación, le mostraré unos ejemplos: 
 




Round Opción A Opción B 
  Bola azul (gana) Bola verde (pierde) 
1 3,400 6,800 3,400 
2 3,400 6,800 2,800 
3 3,400 6,800 2,000 
4 3,400 6,800 1,500 
5 3,400 6,800 1,150 
6 3,400 6,800 950 
7 3,400 6,800 750 
8 3,400 6,800 550 
9 3,400 6,800 400 
10 3,400 6,800 200 
11 3,400 6,800 0 
Respuesta: 
Elijo la opción B desde la pregunta 1 - ___________3_________ 
Elijo la opción A desde la pregunta ______________4_____- 11 
 
Ejemplo 2: Nunca cambiar hacia la opción A 
Round Opción A Opción B 
  Bola azul (gana) Bola verde (pierde) 
1 3,400 6,800 3,400 
2 3,400 6,800 2,800 
3 3,400 6,800 2,000 
4 3,400 6,800 1,500 
5 3,400 6,800 1,150 
6 3,400 6,800 950 
7 3,400 6,800 750 
8 3,400 6,800 550 
9 3,400 6,800 400 
10 3,400 6,800 200 
11 3,400 6,800 0 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción B desde la pregunta 1 - ___________11________ 











Ejemplo 3: Cambiar y elegir la opción A desde el inicio del juego 
Round Opción A Opción B 
  Bola azul (gana) Bola verde (pierde) 
1 3,400 6,800 3,400 
2 3,400 6,800 2,800 
3 3,400 6,800 2,000 
4 3,400 6,800 1,500 
5 3,400 6,800 1,150 
6 3,400 6,800 950 
7 3,400 6,800 750 
8 3,400 6,800 550 
9 3,400 6,800 400 
10 3,400 6,800 200 
11 3,400 6,800 0 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción B desde la pregunta 1 - _____________________ 






Pregunta Opción A Opción B 
  Bola azul (gana) Bola verde (pierde) 
1 2,000 4,000 2,000 
2 2,000 4,000 1,600 
3 2,000 4,000 1,050 
4 2,000 4,000 520 
5 2,000 4,000 210 
6 2,000 4,000 70 
7 2,000 4,000 20 
8 2,000 4,000 10 
9 2,000 4,000 5 
10 2,000 4,000 1 
11 2,000 4,000 0 
Respuesta: 
Elijo la opción B desde la pregunta 1 - ____________________ 
Elijo la opción A desde la pregunta ____________________- 11 
 
En el juego que acaba de responder ¿Cuántas bolas azules y verdes cree que hay 
en la bolsa? 





Instrucciones Sección 2 
Las reglas para esta sección, son las mismas que en el juego anterior y la cantidad de 
dinero que usted puede ganar también es igual. Sin embargo ahora le hago saber que en 
la bolsa hay cinco (5) bolas azules y cinco (5) bolas verdes, si usted selecciona una 
bola azul gana, si elige una bola verde pierde. Ahora usted conoce las probabilidades de 
ganar y de perder en la opción B.  
Por favor considere esta nueva información antes de hacer una 
elección 
 
Pregunta Opción A 
Opción B 
Bola azul (gana)        
5 de 10 
Bola verde (pierde)     
5 de 10 
12 2,000 4,000 2,000 
13 2,000 4,000 1,600 
14 2,000 4,000 1,050 
15 2,000 4,000 520 
16 2,000 4,000 210 
17 2,000 4,000 70 
18 2,000 4,000 20 
19 2,000 4,000 10 
20 2,000 4,000 5 
21 2,000 4,000 1 
22 2,000 4,000 0 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción B desde la pregunta 12 - ____________________ 





Instrucciones ronda 2 
En este juego, sus ganancias también dependerán de sus decisiones y de su suerte. Hay 
tres secciones en esta segunda ronda. La primera y segunda sección consta de 14 
preguntas cada una, mientras que la tercera parte tiene siete preguntas. Para un total de 
35 interrogantes. 
Igual que en el juego anterior, por cada sección le mostraré el total de las preguntas y 
usted me debe decir en cuáles desea seleccionar la opción A y en cuáles en la opción B. 
No obstante su punto de partida es la opción A. 
Esta primera sección, al igual que en la ronda anterior, la opción A es la “elección 
segura”, mientras que la opción B es la “elección apuesta”, en este caso puntual le 
acercaré una bolsa que contiene una (1) bola azul y nueve (9) bolas verdes. Si usted 
extrae la bola azul gana la apuesta, si selecciona una bola verde, entonces pierde. 
Le recuerdo una vez más, que sus decisiones se pueden convertir en dinero real, así que 
por favor considere cuidadosamente su respuesta. 
Al igual que en la ronda anterior, le voy a mostrar algunos ejemplos: 
Ejemplo 1: Cambia a la opción B en algún momento del ejercicio 
Pregunta Opción A 
Opción B 
Bola azul (Gana) 
1 de 10 
Bola verde (Pierde) 
9 de 10 
23 2,400 4,100 800 
24 2,400 4,400 800 
25 2,400 5,000 800 
26 2,400 5,600 800 
27 2,400 6,200 800 
28 2,400 6,800 800 
29 2,400 7,700 800 
30 2,400 8,200 800 
31 2,400 10,650 800 
32 2,400 15,200 800 
33 2,400 18,500 800 
34 2,400 25,000 800 
35 2,400 35,000 800 
36 2,400 40,000 800 
 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción A desde la pregunta 23 - ___________32_________ 










Ejemplo 2: Nunca cambiar a la opción B 
Pregunta Opción A 
Opción B 
Bola azul (Gana)  
1 de 10 
Bola verde (Pierde) 
9 de 10 
23 2,400 4,100 800 
24 2,400 4,400 800 
25 2,400 5,000 800 
26 2,400 5,600 800 
27 2,400 6,200 800 
28 2,400 6,800 800 
29 2,400 7,700 800 
30 2,400 8,200 800 
31 2,400 10,650 800 
32 2,400 15,200 800 
33 2,400 18,500 800 
34 2,400 25,000 800 
35 2,400 35,000 800 
36 2,400 40,000 800 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción A desde la pregunta 23 - ___________36________ 
Elijo la opción B desde la pregunta   ____________________- 36 
 
Ejemplo 3: Cambiar desde el inicio a la opción B 
Round Opción (A) 
Opción (B) 
Bola azul (Gana)  
1 de 10 
Bola verde (Pierde) 
9 de 10 
23 2,400 4,100 800 
24 2,400 4,400 800 
25 2,400 5,000 800 
26 2,400 5,600 800 
27 2,400 6,200 800 
28 2,400 6,800 800 
29 2,400 7,700 800 
30 2,400 8,200 800 
31 2,400 10,650 800 
32 2,400 15,200 800 
33 2,400 18,500 800 
34 2,400 25,000 800 
35 2,400 35,000 800 
36 2,400 40,000 800 
 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción A desde la pregunta 23 - _____________________ 






Pregunta Opción A 
Opción B 
Bola azul (Gana)  
1 de 10 
Bola verde (Pierde) 
9 de 10 
23 1,200 2,300 500 
24 1,200 2,500 500 
25 1,200 2,850 500 
26 1,200 3,200 500 
27 1,200 3,650 500 
28 1,200 4,150 500 
29 1,200 5,000 500 
30 1,200 5,600 500 
31 1,200 6,400 500 
32 1,200 7,550 500 
33 1,200 9,200 500 
34 1,200 11,750 500 
35 1,200 16,000 500 
36 1,200 24,800 500 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción A desde la pregunta 23 - ____________________ 





Instrucciones Sección 2 
Las reglas para esta sección, son las mismas que en la parte anterior, no obstante las 
probabilidades de ganar y perder en la opción B han cambiado, de igual manera la 
cantidad de dinero en ambas alternativas también es diferente. La bolsa en la 
“elección apuesta” contiene siete (7) bolas azules y tres (3) bolas verdes. Si usted 
selecciona una bola azul gana, si elige una bola verde pierde.  
Por favor considere esta nueva información antes de hacer una 
elección 
Sección 2 
Pregunta Opción A 
Opción B 
Bola azul (gana)  
7 de 10 
Bola verde (Pierde) 
3 de 10 
37 4,000 4,300 500 
38 4,000 4,350 500 
39 4,000 4,600 500 
40 4,000 4,750 500 
41 4,000 5,000 500 
42 4,000 5,300 500 
43 4,000 5,650 500 
44 4,000 6,000 500 
45 4,000 6,350 500 
46 4,000 6,700 500 
47 4,000 7,300 500 
48 4,000 8,100 500 
49 4,000 9,200 500 
50 4,000 10,600 500 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción A desde la pregunta 37 - ____________________ 





Instrucciones Sección 3 
Las reglas para esta sección son similares a las anteriores, no obstante en esta ocasión 
no existe “opción segura”, ambas alternativas incluyen la probabilidad de ganar y 
perder. De igual manera, la cantidad de dinero que se puede ganar o perder es diferentes 
para ambas opciones.  
Por favor considere que en esta sección podría perder parte del dinero del 
incentivo que se le dará en esta sesión. 
 
Pregunta 
Opción A Opción B 
Bola azul 
(gana) 5 de 10 
Bola verde 
(pierde) 5 de 10 
Bola azul 
(gana) 5 de 10 
Bola verde 
(pierde) 5 de 10 
51 10,000 Pierde 4,000 15,000 Pierde 12,000 
52 4,000 Pierde  4,000 15,000 Pierde 12,000 
53 1,000 Pierde 4,000 15,000 Pierde 12,000 
54 1,000 Pierde 8,000 15,000 Pierde 12,000 
55 1,000 Pierde 8,000 15,000 Pierde 12,000 
56 1,000 Pierde 8,000 15,000 Pierde 12,000 
57 1,000 Pierde 8,000 15,000 Pierde 12,000 
Su respuesta: 
Elijo la opción A desde la pregunta 51 - ____________________ 





Lugar: ____________________________ Fecha: ________________________________ 




1. ¿Cuál es el ingreso total mensual de su hogar (sumando el de todos los miembros de su 
hogar)? 
□ Menos de 135.000 pesos 
□ 135.001 – 247.000 pesos 
□ 247.001 – 450.000 pesos 
□ 450.001 – 840.000 pesos 
□ Más de 840.001 pesos 
2. ¿Cuál es su ingreso total mensual proveniente del cultivo de frambuesa? ______ Pesos/mes 
3. Insumos utilizados en el cultivo de la frambuesa 
Ítem Unidad Cantidad Costo unitario No usó o no compró ésta 
temporada 
Plantas     
Herbicidas     
Pesticidas     
Fertilizantes 
convencionales 
    
Fertilizantes 
Orgánicos 
    
Abono Foliar     
4. Mano de obra contratada temporada 2014 – 2015 
Labor Jornada/hombre Costo unitario por jornada 
Cosecha   
Poda   
Aplicaciones   
Otros, ¿cuáles?___________   
5. ¿Tiene acceso a una cuenta bancaria? □ Si □ No 
6. ¿Tiene acceso a préstamos agrícolas? □ Si continúe  □ No salte pregunta 8 
7. ¿Cuál es la Fuente de este préstamo?  
□ INDAP 
□ Servicios bancarios 
□ Empresa de insumos 
□ Asociación de productores 
□ Agroindustria 
Otro: ___________________________ 
Sección de producción y comercialización 
8. ¿Cuántos años tiene trabajando con el cultivo de frambuesa? ____________________ Años 
9. ¿Cuál su área total de producción agrícola? ______________________________ Hectáreas 




11. De ese total ¿Cuánto es suyo y cuánto renta? Propio: ___________ Renta: __________ Has 
12. ¿Es usted miembro de alguna asociación de productores? Si: __________ No: ___________ 
13. ¿Cuánto tiempo invierte trabajando en su finca? _______________________ horas/semana 
14. ¿Cuánto tiempo invierte trabajando fuera de su finca? ___________________ horas/semana 
15. ¿Ha adoptado nuevas variedades de frambuesa en los últimos cinco años?  
□ Si continúe  □ No pase a pregunta 18 
16. ¿Qué variedades ha adoptado? 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
17. ¿Por qué razones decidió adoptar nuevas variedades de frambuesa?  
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________Pase a pregunta 20 
18. ¿Por qué motivos ha decidido conservar su actual variedad de frambuesa? 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
19. ¿Cuándo fue la última vez que cambió la variedad de frambuesa en el pasado? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
20. ¿Cuál es la procedencia de la variedad de frambuesa que cultiva actualmente? 
□ De institución técnica (ejemplo 
INDAP) 
□ De un vecino 
□ Propagación propia 
□ Vivero formal (certificado) 
□ Otra: _________________________ 
21. ¿Tiene sistema de irrigación en su finca? □ Si continúe □ No pase a pregunta 23 
22. ¿Qué tipo de Sistema de riego posee? 
□ Surco □ Tendido □ Goteo □ Otro: ________________________ 
23. ¿Ha adoptado en su producción alguna de las siguientes prácticas? Marcar todas las que 
aplican 
Infraestructura para cultivos 
□ Bodega para insumos 
□ Bodega materiales cosecha 
□ Sala de cosecha o packing 
□ Zona de acopio 
□ Baño 
□ Cercos (cierre perimetral) 
□ Señaletica 




□ Botiquín para emergencias □ Comedor 
Buenas prácticas agrícolas y gestión 
□ Registro SAG 
□ Registros productivos 
□ Registros de cosecha 
□ Registro de aplicaciones hechas 
□ Registro de costos 
□ Fue auditado por BPA de INDAP 
□ Inicio de actividades 
Prácticas culturales 
□ Monitoreo de plagas 
□ Cobertura entre hileras 
□ Cercos vivos 
□ Cultivos camellón 
□ Uso de compost/guano/estiércol 
□ Cultivos entre hileras asociados 
□ Control de malezas mecánico (sin 
herbicida) 
□ Compra de pesticidas orgánicos 
□ Uso de mulch sobre hileras 
24. ¿Cuánta frambuesa produjo en la última cosecha? ________________________ kg/hectárea 
25. De la producción total obtenida en la cosecha anterior, ¿Cuánto comercializó? ________ % 
26. ¿Cómo comercializa su producción? 
□ Producto fresco 
□ Unidades congeladas (IQF) 
□ Block (Producto residual) 
Otro: ___________________________ 
27. ¿A quién le vende su producción? 




□ Centro de acopio 




Sección Socio - demográfica 
En esta sección la mayoría de las preguntas que le haré son descriptivas, algunas veces 
pudiera parecer que son personales, sin embargo, su respuesta nos ayudará a analizar los 
resultados de los juegos que recién terminamos. Todas sus respuestas son completamente 
confidenciales. Por favor piense cuidadosamente antes de responder. 
28. Estado civil:  □ Soltero □ Divorciado     □ Viudo □ Casado 
29. ¿Cuál es su orientación política? 
□ Izquierda   □Centro izquierda   □Centro   □Centro derecha    □Derecha    □No tengo 
30. ¿Cuántas personas viven con usted en su grupo familiar? __________________ personas  
31. ¿Cuántos años estudió? ________________________________________________ Años 
32. ¿Es usted una persona religiosa? □ Si □ No 
 
 
